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1. Introduction
Imagine that we observe two firms that sell two substitute products at the same location, with the
same price, and incur the same promotional expenses. However, the first firm sells X% more units
than the second. The first product may meet the tastes of a greater proportion of consumers with
its combination of horizontal and/or vertical (quality, technology or design) characteristics. The
product may have been around for longer, and over time it has entered the awareness or trust set
of more consumers. The product may have a better distribution network or is sold under long-term
contracts to large buyers. Whatever the reason, we say that the first firm has an unobserved product
advantage of magnitude X% over the second.1 While unobserved advantages in production are called
productivity, unobserved product advantages are referred to as demand heterogeneity.
Formally, we call unobserved productivity, or TFP, the proportion by which one firm produces a
larger (smaller) quantity of output with the same inputs than a hypothetical average firm in the same
industry would. Similarly, we define an unobserved product advantage as the proportion by which
the firm sells a larger (smaller) quantity of output at the same price than a hypothetical average firm
in the industry would, once the observed explanatory factors have been controlled for (in this paper:
location, age, state support, and sales eﬀort).2 Importantly, we adopt a residual and nonparametric
definition of demand heterogeneity, symmetric to the prevalent definition of productivity.
As Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) stress, firms grow by increasing productivity and set-
ting lower prices (a movement along their demand curves) or by expanding sales by means of observed
and unobserved demad-expanding actions (a shift in their demand curves).3 This explains why firms
1The degree of observability of product advantages depends on the availability of appropriate variables to control
for them. For example, the awareness eﬀect can be partially observed through the impact of variables measuring the
age and market experience of the firm.
2Product advantages are more "rival" than cost advantages. The increase of the level of productivity of one firm
does not aﬀect the level of productivity reached by another firm (although it may result in the stealing of demand
through price competition). However, the development of a product advantage by a firm can be predatory to the
advantage of another firm, although this is not necessarily the case.
3Here are two specific examples referred to our database. Konka is a big TV and electronic producer that, in
2008, was getting 20% of its sales from exports. From 2001 to 2008, its total sales increased by a factor of 1.8 with
exactly the same employment (17,000 employees), while the price of a 21 inch TV fell from 3000 RMB to 1000 RMB.
Tingyi is a producer of instant noodles and beverages whose "Master Kong" brand had about 38% of the domestic
market in 2008. Sales from 1998 to 2008 incresed by a fator of 7.3, while employment more than doubled (up to
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in imperfectly competitive markets make at least three diﬀerent types of investment: physical capital
to carry out production, knowledge and technology to compete in costs, and knowledge and demand
enhancement to compete in products.4 We adopt the dynamic model of endogenous productivity
of Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013), where firms invest in R&D to enhance productivity, and we
extend it to include the investments that determine shifts of the product advantages.
While there is an extensive literature analyzing productivity distributions (see Bartelsman and
Doms, 2000, and Syverson, 2011, for surveys), demand heterogeneity and its distribution have
only been examined recently. One likely reason is that demand heterogeneity has often shown
up as a nuisance. Take the example of the estimation of the production function and markups.
When a researcher has access to firm-level output prices but competition is imperfect, the most
frequently used methods become inconsistent if one admits the presence of demand heterogeneity.5 6
The researcher has incentives to ignore the problem. However, since the significance of demand
heterogeneity and its correlation with included variables has become increasingly documented, it is
pertinent to worry about the robustness of the empirical results based on ignoring it.
As time goes by demand heterogeneity has become an object of interest and research. When
firm-level output prices are not available, then a researcher has no other solution that specifying
how is the heterogeneity of demand. Klette and Griliches (1996) first showed this, a point that was
50,000 employees). However, the price of standard noodles increased from 1.5 RMB in 1998 to 2.8 RMB in 2008.
Sales soared as the firm tripled its centers of distribution and engaged in closer relationships with retailers instead of
relying on wholesalers.
4This is, for example, recognized by the oﬃcial statistical approaches to R&D where breakthroughs are categorized
as "process" or "product" innovations. Recent papers have started to discuss the relative incentives for a firm’s
investment in process and product innovation: Dhingra (2013), Flach and Irlacher (2018).
5This is recognized by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) when they write: "Alternatively (to price takers in the
input and output markets), consider a situation where firms face downward sloping output demand curves (and/or
upward sloping input supply curves). In this case, one will generally need to assume that firms are all facing identical
demand/supply curves; otherwise, firms will have diﬀerent intermediate input (or investment) demand functions (i.e.
the scalar unobservable assumption 4, 4b or 4c will be violated)."
6Under imperfect competition, the first order conditions for input choice include firm marginal revenue (if profit
maximization is assumed) or marginal cost (if cost minimization is assumed). Hence, an Olley and Pakes (1996)/Lev-
isohn and Petrin (2003) method to estimate the production function must replace unobservable productivity with an
inverted input demand that includes unobserved marginal revenue or marginal cost. Non-observable marginal cost
can in principle be replaced by its determinants, but then the relevant firm’s output or its determinants should be in-
cluded. When researchers specify ouput determinants, they implicitly drop the unobservable heterogeneity of demand
that would make estimation inconsistent. This is what papers as De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), De Loecker,
Goldberg, Khandelwal and Pavcnik (2016), or Brandt, Van Biesebroek, Wang and Zhang (2017), for example, do.
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recently restated in De Loecker (2011).7 Both papers solved the involved problems by assuming that
unobserved heterogeneity of demand is iid.
However, in practice, heterogeneity of demand has been found to be persistent and correlated with
included variables. Many researchers have then switched to estimating a "composite" of productiv-
ity and demand heterogeneity (that happens to show up with weights of a third unobservable, the
elasticity of demand), calling it loosely "productivity".8 This is problematic at least for two rea-
sons. First, estimation requires the assumption that this composite follows a Markov process. This
assumption is incompatible with each unobservable following a diﬀerent Markov process. Second,
nothing guarantees that the estimate is going to behave as productivity, particularly in the presence
of correlation among its components. In a recent paper, Guillard, Jaumandreu and Olivari (2018)
find, among other problems, that the composite of the firms that perform R&D does not maintain
the stochastic dominance properties over the composite of non R&D firms that productivity does.
Fortunately, there is already a significant literature that tries to separately estimate demand het-
erogeneity, and thus also establishes a methodology for the consistent estimation of the production
function and productivity in the presence of imperfect competition and demand heterogeneity. Fos-
ter, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008), in a pioneering work, disentangled productivity and demand
heterogeneity using a sample of US quasi-homogeneous good industries, for which they used unit
values as prices. They estimated static residual demand eﬀects. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syver-
son (2016) use the same type of data to estimate a dynamic model of demand accumulation that
underlines the reality of slowly building market shares. Pozzi and Schivardi (2016) develop, in a
broader sample, a similar analysis in terms of time diﬀerences using price changes and a subjective
assessment of demand elasticity from managers. Roberts, Xu, Fan and Zhang (2017) observe the
destination of exports at the product-level for a sample of 738 Chinese footwear producers and take
unit values as prices. They assess the relative importance of the firm idiosyncratic demand eﬀect
across markets and firm specific marginal costs.9
7This problem is also stressed in Katayama, Lu and Tybout (2009).
8 Some examples are Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2017), Asker, Collard-Wesler and De
Loecker (2014), Boler, Moxnes and Ullveit-Moe (2015), Peters, Roberts, Van Ahn and Fryges (2016) and Bilir and
Morales (2016).
9 Some other papers have computed TFP and product advantages to measure their relative role in an empirical
relationship of interest. Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004) check the impact on reallocation of output
among Colombian firms, Aw and Lee (2014) on foreign investments of Taiwanese firms, and Gervais (2015) on the
export decisions and export intensity of US firms. These papers share a static residual demand approach to the
measurement of product advantages, and use TFP or the TFP of the rest of the firms to instrument price or output
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An alternative literature has used tightly parametrized frameworks to do the same job. Hottman,
Redding and Weinstein (2016) model a sample of US supermarket goods with available prices,
allowing for the measurement of productivity and demand heterogeneity. Firm products "appeal",
for example, is derived from the consumers’ valuation weight of each good quantity in a CES function
symmetric over variety valuations. Eslava and Haltiwanger (2017) use the output and input prices
available for Colombian manufacturing to apply a similar CES model to assess the sources of long-
run growth. Forlani, Martin, Mion and Muuls (2017) also uses a tight functional specification of
demand heterogeneity in an exercise aimed at measuring productivity, demand heterogeneity and
markups with Belgian data.10
We depart from these works in three main aspects. First, we extend the exercise of separating
productivity from demand advantages to a sample that includes all kinds of diﬀerentiated products.
We use firms from China’s entire manufacturing (split into ten broad industries). Second, we con-
struct a robust framework. Our product advantages do not depend on the functional specification
and we allow productivity and demand heterogeneity to be freely correlated. Foster, Haltiwanger
and Syverson (2008, 2016), Hottman, Redding and Weinstein (2016), and Eslava and Haltiwanger
(2017) base identification on the orthogonality of productivity and demand heterogeneity, but the
papers that free this correlation consistently show a negative relationship (Roberts, Xu, Fan and
Zhang, 2017; Forlani, Martin, Mion and Muuls, 2017) that we strongly confirm in this paper. This
correlation denies the legitimacy of productivity as instrument for price in the presence of unobserved
demand heterogeneity. Third, we estimate quantity productivity and quantity demand advantages
without using prices. This makes the technique to separate productivity and demand advantages
widely usable because firm-level output prices are rarely available. A corollary is that this makes the
estimates not dependent on the specific assumptions used to construct price indices as happens with
many papers. Of course, the advantages of having a more comprehensive exercise, nonparametrically
oriented and without using prices, come at the cost of some restrictive assumptions. We assess how
restrictive after explaining with some detail how we identify the model.
Here is our identification strategy. We select firms that sell in both the exports and domestic
markets. We assume that each firm sells the same product, group of products, in each market and
verify that the elasticity of demand in the export market is higher than in the domestic market. In
(the last paper uses labor productivity). Taking advantages as a fact, Jaumandreu and Mairesse (2017) explore
exogenous and endogenous determinants of their shifts.
10Grieco, Li and Zhang (2017) is also a simultaneous estimation of unobserved productivity and "quality" imposing
strong functional restrictions.
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this setting, cost advantages have a greater impact on the export market. This allows us to invert
the system of demands for exports and domestic sales, once that prices have been substituted for,
backing up productivity and demand heterogeneity from observed data.11
To implement this strategy, we specify the two demands for the product of the firm.12 Each
demand depends on the firm price for the specific market, observable shifters, and a persistent
unobservable to reflect the product advantages of the firm, which we allow to evolve over time. As
we do not observe output prices, we transform the demands into revenue equations and replace the
explanatory price variable by its optimal level in terms of the firm-specific marginal cost.13 Marginal
cost has an observable part but depends on unobservable productivity too. This transformation gives
us two equations in which the firm’s sales depend on the unobservables productivity and demand
heterogeneity in addition to the observed cost and demand shifters. We specify each unobservable
as a Markov process.
The identification of the parameters of the production function, embedded in the marginal cost
expression, requires the simultaneous estimation of the elasticity of demand for the firm’s products
in both markets. This cannot be done relying solely on the system of demands. Assuming static
pricing14, we specify a third equation with the ratio revenue-variable cost (the inverse of the share of
variable cost in revenue) as dependent variable. This ratio gives a measure of the price average-cost
ratio, which is a function of the elasticities entangled with the short-run returns to scale parameter
of the firm. Neither this equation nor the system of demands are able to identify the elasticiticies
and the parameter of scale by themselves, but their simultaneous estimation can.15 This new
methodology can potentially be applied in other contexts.
Exit and entry are quantitatively important in our sample. There is no particular reason, however,
to think that this turnover creates a sample selection problem and we follow the current practice
of not trying to account for it.16 However, our selection of firms that sell domestically and abroad
11We show that a suﬃcient condition to nonparametrically recover the unobservables is that the demand elasticities
of the two markets are diﬀerent. In practice, we recover the unobservables by inverting our parametric system of
equations, but we are sure that we are picking up something more generally identified.
12Exports and domestic, as in Das, Roberts and Tybout, 2007, and Aw, Roberts and Xu, 2011
13This can be compared to De Loecker (2011), who writes the inverse demand and replaces output by the production
function.
14Like virtually all the empirical works that estimate production function and markups. See, for example, De
Loecker and Warzynski (2012). See Jaumandreu and Lin (2017) for a departure from this assumption.
15Technically, we use a two stage procedure to first estimate a function of the elasticities and scale parameter from
the margin equation, which we use in a second step as restriction in the estimation of the system of demands.
16We follow Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) and Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer
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may be more persuasively argued to create sample selection biases in the estimated coeﬃcients. We
check for these biases adapting the procedure of Olley and Pakes (1996) to the presence of two
unobservables (to continue exporting, we require that the combination of productivity and demand
advantages exceeds a threshold).
We estimate the elasticity of demands, the parameters of the cost (production) function, the
impact of observed shifters and the unobservables. To simultaneously identify productivity and
demand heterogeneity, we use the same basic assumptions used for the "structural" estimation of
production functions: the Markovian character of productivity (extended to demand heterogeneity)
and the "timing" assumption that capital is chosen one period before variable inputs.17 However,
identification also relies on the additional explicit assumptions that the firm has the same marginal
cost whether the product (group of products) is sold domestically or abroad, and that product
advantages are similar in both markets.
Let us make a brief assessment of these additional assumptions. First, it is important to notice
that they are less restrictive than the assumptions embodied in the exercises that implicitly assume
a unique firm demand (and hence a unique and invariant elasticity and markup). The existence of
an aggregate of exports and domestic sales, responding to an aggregate price index, requires very
restrictive assumptions on the composition of sales. Our framework frees these restrictions, allowing
for diﬀerent elasticities, intercepts, and endogenous prices. Second, some theoretical models restrict
the products that are sold in each market through the introduction of product-specific fixed costs18 ,
but the empirical relevance of this exercise is still unclear when domestic versus global export sales
are involved.19 Third, it is very easy (but data demanding) to generalize our model to the presence
of diﬀerent marginal costs, and it is not diﬃcult to model the impact of products in each market as
diﬀering in terms of observables. We leave these extensions for future research. Finally, we check
that the eﬀect of product advantages can be sensibly taken as the same in both markets by allowing
the unobservable to impact diﬀerently exports and the domestic market. The results demonstrate
that the assumption of similar impact is not unreasonable for most of the markets.
(2015). The likelihood of immediate reaction to the negative (positive) shocks which can trigger biases is low.
17 See the Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) summary of assumptions on Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003), and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013).
18 In Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2014, 2016), firms export only a subset of their product range, the products
that are expected to perform best according to the increased toughness of competition in foreign markets.
19For example, Manova and Zhang (2012) show with detail the multiproduct character of the exports of Chinese
firms and the wide price discrimination practiced across destinations. However, the character of the data (customs
data) impedes the comparison with the domestic sales.
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The estimation of the model produces three kinds of results. First, it generates an unrestricted
estimate of the joint distribution of productivity and demand heterogeneity, as well as its change
over time. Second, it highlights biases aﬀecting other estimates of the coeﬃcients of the production
function, demand elasticities and markups, attributable to ignoring the heterogeneity of demand.
Third, with the analytical scalpel that separates cost and product advantages, we revisit and rein-
terpret recent studies on China manufacturing, often reversing their policy consequences. In the
next section, we summarize these results comparing them with the relevant literature.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarizes results and related literature. In
Section 3, we show that the unobservable cost and product advantages are characteristics that are
nonparametrically identified in the absence of prices. Section 4 introduces the data and describes the
sample. In Section 5, we set out our particular empirical parametric specification. Section 6 explains
how we estimate the econometric model. Section 7 reports the results of estimation, describes the
joint distribution and the correlations of the estimated cost and product advantages, and performs
some descriptive exercises. Section 8 concludes. There are five appendices and an online appendix.
2. Results and related literature overview
We get a reasonable marginal distribution of productivity that has a moderate dispersion, which
remains stable over time, and a huge change in mean during the period.20 Product advantages,
compared in a proper scale, are slightly more dispersed and change very slowly and heterogeneously
(only Machinery and Electronics display a change of magnitude comparable to productivity).21 De-
spite its heterogeneity, unobservable product advantages explain about 24% of the revenue growth
based on productivity and demand heterogeneity. The joint distribution shows a strong negative
correlation of the unobserved cost and demand advantages. This negative correlation of the unob-
servables is also found by Roberts, Xu, Fan and Zhang (2017) and Forlani, Martin, Mion and Muuls
(2017).22 Our interpretation is that many firms that show unobserved product advantages (qual-
ity, technology, design, distribution...) tend to show additional costs not captured by the observed
20The dispersion of our distributions is not far from the result obtained by Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008)
with a quasi-homogeneous goods sample, but it is far below the dispersion obtained by Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
who use the same kind of sample that we use. This is likely due to our separation of productivity and demand
heterogeneity.
21Our demand heterogeneity estimates have less dispersion than those in Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2016).
22Grieco and MacDevitt (2016) also find a negative relationship between productivity and quality of the product
in their industry-specific analysis of a health industry.
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wage and materials bill (non-wage costs of skills, costs of management of superior materials and
costs of organization, etc.). As the observed part of marginal cost is positively correlated with the
product advantages (something that it is also found by Hottman, Redding and Weinstein, 2016),
the observed and unobserved parts of marginal cost generate a strong positive correlation between
marginal cost and product advantages. Developing product advantages is aﬀected by a trade-oﬀ.
Combining quality, design, technology or better distribution with low costs, has technological and
firm knowledge/ability limits which impact the growth paths of firms.23
We get elasticities of demand that are larger than the elasticities estimated in many studies,
although perfectly consistent with our estimated short-run production elasticity of scale and short-
run profitabilities. Our average elasticity is 10 in domestic markets and elasticities roughly double in
export markets (similar to Das, Roberts and Tybout, 2007). Export markets hence emerge as more
competitive, and firms set lower prices and get smaller margins. We also get reasonable estimates
of the marginal cost (production function) coeﬃcients for all industries. The average elasticity of
materials is 0.66, 0.24 for labor, and 0.90 together. The implicit average markup in the domestic
market is 0.12 and 0.06 in the export market.24
Our estimates suggest that uncontrolled heterogeneity of demand is likely to bias significantly
downward the estimates of elasticity of demand through two diﬀerent channels. When the elasticity
of demand is directly estimated by regressing sales on prices, the noncontrolled positive correlation
between price (through marginal cost) and product advantages induces small elasticities. An example
of this happens when productivity is considered a valid instrument for price (Foster, Haltiwanger
and Syverson, 2008 and 2016; Hottman, Redding and Weinstein, 2016, and Eslava and Haltiwanger,
2017). On the other hand, when markups are computed by dividing a production elasticity by the
(corrected) corresponding input share, a method popularized by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012),
the absence of control for the heterogeneity of demand in the estimation of the production elasticity
induces large markups (small implicit demand elasticities). For example, Brandt, Van Biesebroek,
Wang and Zhang (2017), with identical data to ours, get an average coeﬃcient on materials of
0.913 that is by itself greater than our elasticity of scale and an average markup as large as 0.23
23This starts to be a well-established fact for diﬀerentiated products, which suggests that we are applying the simple
production function conceived for homogeneous outputs to activities that are quality heterogeneous. Jaumandreu and
Yin (2018) suggests that a next step of research should be estimating productivity gross of quality, or productivity
keeping its potential to become quality.
24Markups can be computed using the price average-cost margins in Table 3 combined with the elasticity of scale
reported in Table 4.
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(the positive margins of Lu and Yu 2015, estimated by the same method, show the same average
value).25 These biases are likely to impact also the correlations on which inferences are based. This
urgently calls for the adoption of methods that are robust to the heterogeneity of demand.
The separated estimation of productivity and product advantages allows us to reinterpret many
recent results on China manufacturing. Our data show again how important turnover is in the
transformation of China manufacturing, as already pointed out by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and
Zhang (2012) and Hsieh and Song (2015). However, entrants are initially less cost eﬃcient. This is
contrary to the conclusions of Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) who are mislead by the fact
that entrants contribute important product advantages. Reallocation among incumbents according
to productivity growth happens to be important, but again this can be missed if one cannot separate
productivity growth from the decline of product advantages of big firms (as happens to Brandt, Van
Biesebroeck and Zhang, 2012). Controlling by selection, our results give a very modest role to
privatization in the increase of intramural productivity, which is very similar to what Hsieh and
Song (2017) found, and still smaller in the development of product advantages.26 Our splitting of
advantages supplements a nice description of what happened. Productivity grows strongly under the
reform at firms that remain under state control, so the relative increases associated with privatization
are small. However, all firms that either were or stay under the control of the state seem to be
prevented from achieving the large increases in product advantages that the new private entrants
show. Private activity appears much more skilled at detecting new commercial opportunities than
the state, while the state is quite able to reinforce productivity of established activities.
We also find the key to explaining the apparent "low eﬃciency" that seems to characterize big
exporters and has puzzled researchers who have dived into the question (see, for example, Lu 2010).
A significant set of firms with big cost advantages and no product advantages (low wages plus low
technology) tend to specialize in the export market, selling most of their production abroad. Their
productivity is large, but this is not apparent in an analysis without separation because of their lack
of product advantages.
The whole picture that we obtain for the period is that Chinese firms relied heavily on cost
competition to grow, and more modestly on product advantages (although these product advantages
sharply developed in Electronics and Machinery). This mix fits well with the findings in Fan, Li
25For Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang and Zhang (2017), see Table A2 and Table A3 of the Online Appendix. For
Lu and Yu (2015), see Table 5 of the Appendix.
26Chen, Igami, Sawada and Xiao (2017) is a paper that tries to dig on the role of privatization on the increase of
productivity with structural methods. The challenge is to deal simultaneously with selection.
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and Yeaple (2015), who reveal improved products and prices over time, and with Kee and Tang
(2016), who detect an increasing ratio of domestic value added on total exports. However, we
detect a slowness in acquiring product advantages that could hurt Chinese exports in the long-run,
particularly as other countries engage more intensely in the race (see Sutton, 2001 and 2007, for
insights on a development model based on a mix of cost and product advantages). Interestingly, this
matches the implicit diagnosis of the policy-makers who designed "Made in China 2025."27
Our findings, however, do not support the popular idea advanced by Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
of a productivity gap in China economy sustained by "price distortions". The methodology and
measurement that support this idea are based on the (until now) untested assumption that the
value of the so-called "revenue productivity" should be equal for all firms in an industry, and that
diﬀerences in this value exclusively reflect exogenous (policy induced) distortions of prices.28 The
implication is that the reallocation of resources that would increase productivity is the switching of
output to the lowest cost firms. What we find with the same data is a huge endogenous heterogeneity
of product quality and technology associated with a corresponding endogenous heterogeneity of input
prices, eﬃciency and marginal costs. Optimal reallocation policy should consist of stimulating the
welfare maximizing combination of product and cost advantages, what would include to boost the
production of some of the highest cost firms in the industry. This diﬀerence of policy implications
suggests that the literature on reallocation of resources needs to accommodate the separation between
cost and product advantages.29
3. Model and identification
In this section we present the model and show that the main characteristics of interest, the demand
and cost advantages of the firms, are nonparametrically identified from revenue, input prices, input
quantities and demand shifters.
27 "Made in China 2025" is an ambitious plan for manufacturing to become more innovation-driven, higher quality,
greener and based on greater human capital.
28A recent paper by Haltiwanger, Kulick and Syverson (2017) criticizes the restrictions implicit in the functional
forms used by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) as responsible for the invariance of "revenue productivity", a property that
they do not find to hold in their data. Our stress here is that endogenously heterogeneous input prices warrant, even if
the functional form restrictions were right, that "revenue productivity" is going to change across firms with a motive
that clearly diﬀers from "price distortions".
29Dhingra and Morrow (2018) is a paper that analyzes how the productivity heterogeneity of firms impacts the
welfare analysis of reallocation. However, nothing has been developed, to our knowledge, about how demand hetero-
geneity impacts this analysis.
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3.1 Revenue as a function of cost and product advantages.
Firm  produces a product that sells in two or more monopolistically competitive markets.30 Let
us consider market  of firm  The demand for the product at moment  is
 = (   ) (1)
where   is the price set by the firm,  is a vector of observed market and firm specific demand
shifters, and  is a scalar unobservable that measures unspecified advantages linked to the firm’s
product.31 We assume without loss of generality that (·) is monotonic in  and that the impact
of  is positive. Some demand shifters may be set by the firm (e.g. the level of sales eﬀort).
The firm has production function
 =  (  )
where  =
X

 is total firm output variables   and  stand for capital, labor and
materials respectively, and  is a scalar unobservable that measures unspecified advantages with
a positive impact on the production level of the firm. We assume that  (·) is monotonic in 
The term  is usually called productivity.32 Let us write the dual marginal cost as  =
( ) where  is a vector of observable prices and quantities of the inputs.33
30From monopolistic competition we use the properties that each firm faces a downward-sloping demand for its
product and that a price change by one firm has a negligible eﬀect on the demand of any other firm (Tirole, 1989).
31Demand estimation since Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) has richly used the discrete-choice
framework to explain product shares in specific markets, with focus in consumer tastes. Market shares are a function of
the observable product characteristics, price, and an unobserved linear utility eﬀects of omitted characteristics usually
denoted as  for product  Some authors model  as an AR(1) process (see Lee, 2013, and Sweeting, 2013). Our
product advantages are basically a combination of the  term and the nonlinearities of the expression for   However,
between the usual industry-specific BLP exercise and the exercise here there are two important diﬀerences. First,
observed product characteristics typically reach an important level of detail that is not available for an interindustry
study. Second, with interindustry data, the usual firm-level observation of a multi-product firm refers to the composite
of product-specific demands (that are likely to belong to diﬀerent markets).
32Productivity is almost universally specified as Hicks neutral. Therefore, the production function is written as
 =  ( ) exp() We keep, for the moment, a more general specification that is symmetric with the
specification of the demand advantages 
33Consider the following example. Given  and calling wage  and the price of materials  the variable
cost function is  = (   ) and  =  (·). The conditional demand for materials is
 =  (   ) Solving this demand for output, and replacing output in the marginal cost
function, one gets the expression of the text with  = { }
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Multiplying both sides of equation (1) by   we get the revenue expression
 =  (   ) (2)
and, inverting the profit maximization condition (   ) =( )34 we can write
  =−1(( )  ) (3)
Combining equations (2) and (3) we finally have
 = (( )  ) (4)
This equation35 is useful when prices are not observed and we cannot work with equation (1).
Equation (4) says that revenue is a function of both the observable factors which determine marginal
cost and the demand shifters, and of the two unobservables representing the demand and cost advan-
tages of the firm. Even if we were able to perfectly measure all the observable variables, we cannot
separately recover  and  from equation (4). Recovering a combination might be interesting
on its own, but our main objective is to show how  and  can be separately nonparametrically
identified.
3.2 Recovering  and 
What we need is to observe the firm selling the product in (at least) two markets. Suppose, for
example, the firm sells the product in the exports (X) and domestic (D) market. We have two
revenue functions
 = (( )   )
 = (( )   ) (5)
If this system can be solved, we can get  and  expressed in terms of observables
 = (       )
 = (       ) (6)
34We assume that MR is monotonic in price. Firm equilibrium is unique if the profit function is strictly quasiconcave,
that is a standard condition assumed in monopolistic competition models (see, for example, Zhelobodko, Kokovin,
Parenti and Thisse, 2012). Quasiconcavity of the profit function when marginal costs is constant, for example, is
suﬃcient to ensure the invertibility of marginal revenue.
35 It is easy to show that

  0 If the demand elasticity is non-increasing for the demand shifters and  we
have

  0 and

  0
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This inversion allows us to set an estimable model controlling for persistent unobservables in terms
of observables and gives us a way to back out the advantages from revenue, input prices, input
quantities and shifters.
Let us discuss when the system can be inverted. Call  the ratio of semielasticities of revenue
with respect to the product advantages, i.e.  = 1

  1

  Let  and  be the
absolute value of the elasticity of demand in the export and domestic market. Then we can establish
Proposition. If the ratio of elasticities (− 1)(− 1) is diﬀerent from  system (5) can
be inverted.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuitive reason by which  and  can be identified is that their eﬀects are diﬀerent in each
market. Cost advantages operate through the price set in each market. As long as the price eﬀects
are diﬀerent, the variation in revenues identifies the advantages.36 One particular case happens
when product advantages have the same impact in each market,  = 1 In this case, it is suﬃcient
for identification that the demand elasticities are diﬀerent in the two markets.
3.3 An estimable model.
Cost and product advantages are likely to be both persistent over time and subject to unexpected
shocks. We use the modeling for unobserved productivity in production functions introduced by
Olley and Pakes (1996). We assume that the cost and product advantages follow the first order
Markov processes
 = (−1) + 
 = (−1) +  (7)
where (·) and (·) are unknown functions. Advantages at moment  are decomposed into the
level predictable from its value at moment  − 1 and the mean independent shocks  and 
Unobservables −1 and −1 can be recovered using (6) lagged and plugged into (7). Then (7)
can be inserted into (5), so that we have the nonparametric structural econometric model
 = (( (−1) + )   (−1) + )
 = (( (−1) + )   (−1) + ) (8)
36Except when the ratio of these eﬀects exactly matches the relative eﬀects of the product advantages.
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where (·) = ((·)) (·) = ((·)) and −1 = {−1 −1 −1 −1 −1}
Equations (8) form a system which contains a few variables that maybe correlated with  and
 Other variables are assumed independent, and both disturbances are present in both equations.
Matzkin (2007, 2013) discusses nonparametric identification of systems of this type. In what follows,
we specify and estimate a parametric version of the model. However, the advantages that we want
to characterize are identified under much more general specifications.
4. Data
In what follows, we firstly describe how we build a panel data set, construct variables and clean
the data.37 Then we assess the dynamics of the data and sample that we are going to use and
comment the descriptive statistics.
4.1 Source and treatment.
Our data comes from the Annual Census of Industrial Production, a firm-level survey conducted
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. The target of the census is all industrial
non-state firms with more than 5 million RMB in annual sales plus all industrial state-owned firms
(SOEs).38 The source is the same as in Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012); we draw
intensively on their work at the time of treating the data.39 Our data was collected from 1998 to
2008.
In the raw data, the same firm can show up at diﬀerent moments with diﬀerent identifiers. It is
very important to link these separate observations for two reasons: to get the right time sequences
of observations for each firm, and to determine if the firm shutdown during the period. We describe
the linking process and analyze its results in Section A5.1 of the Online Appendix.40 After linking
37We want to use the data as a panel of firms. We want to exploit all the observations repeated over time which
are available for the same individual. One reason is that our modeling implies persistent productivity and product
advantages that evolve over time. Therefore, their estimation depends on the sequence of observations for the firm.
38After 2006, SOEs with less than 5 million RMB are excluded from the survey. This aﬀects only a few firms; we
count 22 firms in 2006 that did not answer the survey the following year.
39Other recent studies which use this source are Brandt, Van Biesebroek, Wang and Zhang (2017); Roberts, Xu,
Fan and Zhang (2016); Lu and Yu (2015); Lu (2010) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
40Our manufacturing linked data is very similar to Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012), but the focus of
our analysis is individual firms dynamics. We exclude firms with a single observation from this analysis and we
systematically identify entrants separately from additions to the survey.
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the data we find reasonable rates of economic entry, additions and exit, which average 9.4%, 7.8%
and 7.9% respectively. Many additions are likely to come from firms growing large enough to be
included in the survey. But this is not everything, additionally there are improvements over time in
statistical coverage that need to be accounted for to get the right interpretation of the numbers.41
The survey information includes location, industry code, the date of creation, details on ownership
and some financial information. We obtain or construct: revenue (split into domestic sales and
exports), an estimate of physical capital, wage bill, cost of materials, subsidies, the number of
workers and the amount spent on sales promotion and (for a few years) on R&D investment. In
Appendix B, we detail the content of these items as well as the definition of other variables. Using the
industry codes, we allocate firms into ten industries. In Appendix C, we describe the correspondence
with the two-digit codes breakdown and list the number of four-digit codes included in each industry.
We check for consistency of the variables and clean the data by dropping abnormal observations.42
We then use the firm’s longest time subsequence of complete data, provided that is longer than one
year. The cleaned data set retains 84% of the firms and 74% of the raw observations.
4.2 Growth and reallocation.
The treated data shows that Chinese firms underwent important growth during this period. Ad-
ditionally, there was a large reallocation of manufacturing activity.43 Only 25% of the firms in the
starting year reach the final year (survivors). The rest shutdown before the final year (exitors).
However, due to entry and additions, the total number of firms in the data nearly triples. About
77% of the firms in the final year are born during the time period (entrants). The other 23% consists
of surviving firms plus additions to the database. Survivors in the final year only represent about
9% of firms and the additions to the survey constitute 14%.
Survivors grow over time, entrants and additions to the survey are significantly smaller.44 The
exitors, although smaller than survivors, are in turn larger than entrants and additions. The result
is that output and productivity increase sharply while production becomes dominated by newer
smaller firms. The production of the average firm roughly triples. However, average capital tends
to decrease and average employment decreases by a third from its starting level.
41Additions often sell more than 5 M RMB and the ratio of data aggregates to industry GDP estimates in the
China Statistical Yearbook is increasing. See Section A5.1 of the Online Appendix for details.
42As described in Section A5.2 of the Online Appendix.
43Details can be checked in Table 0c of the Online Appendix.
44From here on, we measure firm size by employment. Results are similar if we use capital.
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4.3 Sample.
We draw our sample by selecting all the available (continuous) time sequences of firms operating
in the domestic and foreign markets. The sample shares all the previously discussed characteristics
with two important distinctions. First, turnover now includes firms that start to export and stop
exporting. Some of the firms present initially or entered later leave the sample because, although
still alive, they stop exporting. A consequence is that the proportion of firms in the first year of the
sample which stay until the final year is somewhat smaller (20%). Firms that join the sample now
include existing firms that start to export together with the new born entrants. Second, firms are
bigger. The average sizes of all categories of firms are roughly twice the global averages.
We compute a standard TFP measure: the growth of deflated revenue minus the growth of capital,
labor and deflated materials, weighted by the average cost shares between  and −1 computed using
a common cost of capital. TFP growth is strong, especially after 2001, and averages 2.8%, both for
all the treated data and our sample. This estimate exactly matches the main estimate by Brandt,
Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012).
4.4 Descriptive statistics.
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics of the sample by industry. In total, there are more
than 73,000 firms and 290,000 observations.
For firms in the sample, column (3) of Table 1 reports the share of industry sales in 2008 and
column (4) states the firms’ average export intensity (the proportion of sales in foreign markets).
Firms in the sample represent between 20% to 70% of corresponding industry sales, 40% or more
in the most technologically intensive industries. The average export intensity ranges from 35% to
60%, depending on industry. In each industry, less than 25% of firms are located in Middle or
Western China (column 5), and the percentage tends to be significantly lower in most industries.
The average age is between 8 and 14 years (column 6), but firms diﬀer little in their average export
experience (column 7). To summarize, firms in the sample explain an important fraction of sales
in each industry. They tend to represent a greater portion the more technologically intensive the
industry is, and export a large part of their sales. On average, firms are young and with limited
experience in the export market.
The 2000s witnessed a massive change of ownership of Chinese firms. In the sample, columns (8)
to (11) document this fact. For simplicity, we do not pay attention to the exact level of participation
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of the state45 and we categorize firms with participation versus firms without participation. Then,
adding a dynamic dimension referred to the whole sample period, we classify them as "always state
(participated)," "always private" and firms that experience a change in their participation (mostly
from state participated to private).
At the beginning of the period, in 1998, each type of firm represents roughly a third of all firms.
At the end of the period, in 2008, "always state" firms represent 4.5% while "always private" firms
account for at least 80% in all industries. This radical change in composition has two sources: the
shutdown of many state participated firms and the overwhelming proportion of entrants that are
private (at least 90% in all industries). The rest are firms that experience a change in their status,
mostly from state participated to private. The absolute number of this type of firms is roughly
stable over the time period. However, its relative share has shrunk due to entry of new firms.
Table 2 contains more descriptive statistics. Between 15% to 30% of firms receive state subsidies
(columns 1 and 2), but their average value is very small (less than 1% of revenue). Subsidies are
orthogonal to the participation of state in the financial capital of the firm. Foreign participation
(columns 3 and 4) occurs in 20% to 35% of the firms and, when it is present, it represents, on
average, a solid majority of financial capital.
Economic and investment data show significant heterogeneity across industries. The average size
of firms (column 5) is between 290 to 760 workers. Across industries, margins (PACMs) range from
10% to 20%. Virtually all firms show some sales eﬀort (column 7). The average intensity is between
2.5% to 6% of sales (column 8). The proportion of firms that invest in R&D (column 9) ranges
from 8.5% to 32%. The average intensity of these investments (column 10) goes from a little less
than 1% to 2%, indicating varying degrees of technological sophistication. Finally, we report the log
of the firm-level average wage divided by the industry-wide average wage (column 11). Under the
assumption of a competitive labor market, where firms pay the value of marginal productivity, this
ratio provides a measure of the degree by which the firm-level average marginal productivity of labor
exceeds (falls short of) the industry level average. This average is likely to be closely related to the
degree of workforce skills. It is an indicator of the relative quality of the firm-level labor input. It
tends to show moderately negative average values and great intraindustry dispersion.
45State participation, when positive, is on average very high (60% to 70% of capital), but 30% to 40% of firms have
state participations under 50% of finacial capital.
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5. An empirical specification to estimate cost and product advantages
5.1 Demand.
Firms produce a single product, in practice a set of products that we treat as one, that sell in
the domestic (D) and export (X) markets. Both markets are monopolistically competitive. The
demands for the product of firm  are
 = 0
Ã

!−
exp( + )
 = 0
Ã

!−
exp( + ) (9)
The terms 0 and 0 are constants,  and  are common industry elasticities, and   and
 industry price indices.46
The firm’s demand is shifted by two components in each market. The first component is the
impact of a vector of observables .47 The second component is the idiosyncratic unobservable 
representing the unexplained level of advantages of the product.48 We model  as firm specific,
persistent over time and embodying unexpected shocks (see below). Two firms with similar prices
and relevant observable advantages can still show a diﬀerent level of market penetration given
by the level of their unobserved product advantages. By its definition,  also includes demand
improvements (deteriorations) common to all firms in the market. For example, a pull of industry
exports aﬀecting all firms or a decrease in the level of demand available to each firm due to the entry
46Expressions (9) in logs coincide with first order approximations to any demand. We further discuss this specifi-
cation in section A3 of the Online Appendix.
47 Some shifters may be endogenously determined by the firm in the short run. This is likely to happen with sales
eﬀort. Let  represent the log of expenditures on advertising and promotion in market  and suppose that the firm
optimally sets   and exp() The Dorfman and Steiner (1954) condition for optimal determination of exp()
gives
exp()
 =
  which can be also written as  = 11− (ln0 + ln
 − ( − 1) + ) where  stands for
the log of price. Note that if we had prices, this latest equation could be exploited in an Olley and Pakes (1996) type
of procedure to estimate demand advantages.
48The terms  +  and  +  tell us the additional quantity of the product of firm  that is bought by
consumers when its price is equal to the price of a rival for whom these demand terms are equal to zero. We could
also write  = 
³
0
´− 1 exp(( + )) The same terms scaled by the corresponding  can be
read as describing how much more the consumers are willing to pay for the same quantity of the good with respect
to the price of a product with zero advantages.
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of new firms in the market.
A restriction of our empirical modeling is the assumption that the impacts of the unobserved
advantages  are the same in both markets.49 It stems from the lack of firm-level prices. We need
two equations to disentangle  from  The estimation of a diﬀerent  in each market would
require a third equation. In the empirical part we check for the robustness of our assumption by
allowing the impact of product advantages to diﬀer across markets. The same product characteristics
are supposed to have an impact  in the domestic market and  on exports.
5.2 Production and cost.
Firm  produces its product (set of products) with Cobb-Douglas production function
 = exp(0)   exp() (10)
where  represents Hicks neutral productivity.50 We assume that  is given and that the firm
freely chooses  and  in the short-run We denote the short-run elasticity of scale by  =
 +  . We call the corresponding variable cost  and marginal cost  A consequence of
Hicks neutrality is that  can be separated into observed variables and unobserved  so we
write  = exp(−)
5.3 Firm equilibrium.
According to demands (9) and the cost implied by (10), the firm sets the prices and quantities
    and  to maximize short-run profits. To do so the firm takes into account  the
current values of the shifters, and the values of  and  (unobservable for the econometrician but
observable for the firm). The first order conditions can be written as
 (1− 1 ) = 
 (1− 1 ) =  (11)
Simultaneous to the price and output choices, the firm determines the variable input quantities
49Roberts, Xu, Fan and Zhang (2016) specify a common firm eﬀect across destination markets that turns out to be
the dominant eﬀect of their model.
50Notice that our unobserved demand advantages  are also “neutral” with respect to other shifters.
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 and  according to the cost minimizing conditions:
 exp(0)  −1 exp() = 
 exp(0) −1  exp() = (1 +∆) (12)
where ∆ is a shock to the price of labor reflecting the impact of adjustment costs in the short-run.51
Importantly, equations (9), (10), (11) and (12) together imply that variable inputs are correlated
with the unobservables  and  Since both unobservables are persistent, capital  is correlated
too (because past investment choices of the firm are correlated with past values of the unobservables).
The firm-level wage is likely to reflect the productivity level of the firm and possibly the product
advantages, so it is likely to be correlated as well. But, in estimations, we control for the predictable
part of the unobservables  and  This limits endogeneity to the variables that are chosen after
the realization of the unpredictable part of  and  (we discuss later which ones).
5.4 Estimating equations.
Multiplying conditions (12) by  and  respectively and adding them we get  =
(1 + +∆) Using conditions (11) to replace  in  =  +
 dividing everything by total revenue  +  =  inverting the ratio and
taking logs (that we represent henceforth by lowercase letters) we arrive at the equation
ln

 ≡  −  = ln
1


 − 1 − ln
"
1 +
Ã −1−1 − 1
!

#
+  (13)
where  represents the share of revenue from exports in total revenue and the disturbance stands
for the shock  = ln(1 + +∆).
This equation describes the log of revenue over variable cost, or price-average cost margin of the
firm (PACM),52 as the result of the domestic markup multiplied by 1 and the eﬀect of the possible
diﬀerence of markups between the foreign and domestic markets. It generalizes Das, Roberts and
Tybout (2007) and Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011). Under the assumption ( ) = 0 the elasticities
of demand up to parameter  can be estimated by NLS53 If  and  are correlated, identification
51For the dynamic framework that justifies this shadow price of labor see Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013, 2018).
52 ln

 = ln(1 +
−
 ) '
−
 =
−
 =  is a profitability measure that we call
price-average cost margin (PACM). Alternatively, profitability can be measured with the rate of short-run economic
profitability  = −  Notice that  =

1+ 
53This way to estimate elasticities can be related to De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) estimation of firm’s markups.
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is still possible by GMM (we use IV as robustness check). The equation can be easily extended to
relax the assumption of common elasticities in the whole industry by estimating diﬀerent elasticities
for specific groups of firms. In the empirical part, we take advantage of this feature to check the
robustness of our basic estimate.
On the other hand, multiplying demands (9) by output prices, replacing prices on the right hand
side by their optimal choice according to (11), splitting marginal cost and taking logs we have
 =  +  − ( − 1) +  + ( − 1) + 
 =  +  − ( − 1) +  + ( − 1) +  (14)
a revenue system where  and  are constants.54 55
These equations show how revenue in each market depends on the  component of marginal
cost, observed product advantages, the unobserved cost advantage  and the unobserved demand
advantage . They generalize Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011). Appendix D develops the corresponding
equations if marginal cost diﬀers across the two markets.
Equations (14) can be solved for  and . The solution gives
 =  −  + (1)(( − )− ( − )) +
 =  −  + (( − 1))( − )− (( − 1))( − ) (15)
where  = ( − 1)− ( − 1) and  = (1)( −  )56
We specify equations (14) as follows. First, we replace the unobservables by first order exogenous
Markov processes with −1 and −1 replaced by their expressions according to (15). We use
in-homogeneous Markov processes which include time eﬀects because the equations (15) contain a
common price term that we cannot strictly observe. These time eﬀects collapse with the other time
eﬀects present in the equations (the time eﬀects representing  and  ).
Second, we specify  and −1 using two diﬀerent expressions. Inside the unknown (·)
function we use the lagged first order condition for materials solved for −1, so we have −1 =
Let’s suppose only one market and call the markup  =   De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) propose to
estimate markups as  = () exp(−) using previous estimates of  and the disturbance  Our equation
reorders this expression as  = 1  exp() and estimates in one stage, giving a diﬀerent interpretation to the
disturbance. They stress the heterogeneity of , we are mainly interested in splitting it as the outcome of operating
in two diﬀerent markets.
54The marginal cost component  can take diﬀerent forms. We discuss later our specific choices.
55 = ln0 − ( − 1) ln −1 and  = ln0 − ( − 1) ln
−1 
56 = ( − ) and  = −(( − 1) − ( − 1))
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− ln − 0 + −1 − −1 − −1 + (1−  )−1 For , we use the expression that
results from aggregating equations (12), = − ln(+ )−0+−−−−
Part of this expression goes to the constants and another to the disturbances.
The resulting system of revenue equations can be written as57
 =  − ( − 1)( −  −  − ) + 
+1[(−1 − −1)− (−1 − −1)
+ (−1 − −1 − −1 + (1−  )−1)] (16)
+1[( − 1)(−1 − −1)− ( − 1)(−1 − −1)] + 1
 =  − ( − 1)( −  −  − ) + 
+2[(−1 − −1)− (−1 − −1)
+ (−1 − −1 − −1 + (1−  )−1)] (17)
+2[( − 1)(−1 − −1)− ( − 1)(−1 − −1)] + 2
where  and  are combinations of a constant and time eﬀects. The terms 1(·) 1(·) 2(·) and
2(·) are unknown functions and the disturbances are 1 = ( − 1) + ( − 1) +  and
2 = ( − 1) + ( − 1) + .
5.5 Identification and back up of  and .
Identification hinges on equations (13), (16) and (17). We need to estimate parameters    and
 of the production function (marginal cost), demand elasticities  and  and shift parameters
 and  to be able to backup  and  using equation (15). In principle, all parameters can
be estimated from equations (16) and (17), but identification of the elasticities and the parameter
of scale ( = + ) using only these equations seems quite weak. Equation (13) is a very robust
relationship that cannot identify the elasticities and the parameter of scale by itself. We apply NLS
to equation (13) to estimate the functions  = ln 1 −1 and  =
−1
−1−1We then plug these
estimates as restrictions in the system formed by (16) and (17) and estimate all parameters of the
revenue system by nonlinear GMM. To back up  and , we employ equations (15) implemented
57We use the fact that an unknown function e( + ) where  is a constant, can be written as  + () where 
is another constant. We also collapse in the coeﬃcients of the function any parameters that multiply the unknown
function or its argument.
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using a rough estimate of the common time index 58
6. Estimation
6.1 A system of semiparametric equations.
The model (16) and (17) is a system of semiparametric equations (see Robinson 1988). Each
equation has two nonparametric functions, the pairs (1 1) and (2 2) The arguments of the
nonparametric functions are log-linear expressions of observed variables. The disturbances are un-
correlated over time and across firms, but can be freely correlated among them.
The system is fully nonlinear in parameters for three reasons: we impose the restrictions implied
by equation (13), for each equation there are cross-restrictions between the parameters of the linear
part and the nonparametric part, and there are cross-restrictions between the two equations. In fact,
the restrictions involving the linear part and the nonparametric functions contribute to identification
(we build on the similar single equation estimation by Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2013).
We approximate the nonparametric functions by means of third order polynomials. We are mod-
eling the unobserved advantages as exogenous processes, therefore each function is univariate and
requires only the estimation of three coeﬃcients. In the empirical part, we use four demand shifters
in each equation (Location, Age/Experience, Subsidy, Sales eﬀort). This implies a total of 13 pa-
rameters of theoretical interest (    ,   and the four-dimension vectors  and ).
However, we have to estimate 30 more: two constants, eight time dummies in each equation and
twelve coeﬃcients of the polynomials. To avoid a nonlinear search on 43 parameters, we proceed
concentrating-out the 32 parameters that enter linearly (we finally enter linearly two alphas).
6.2 Selection.
Our sample consists of time sequences of observations for firms that are observed both exporting
and selling in the domestic market. It might be that the disturbances of equations (13), (16) and
(17) are correlated with the decision to export, therefore creating a sample selection bias. We wish
to draw inferences which are valid for all firms. For example, we are interested in demand elasticities
58We have no separate observations on  and   In estimating (14), the price movements are absorbed in the
time dummies. To recover  and  we will approximate the changes in  from the changes in the only industry
index that is available. The approximation works well because both price indices are likely to move during the period
in parallel. In fact, more refined alternatives have produced the same results.
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or production function coeﬃcients that can be attributed to all firms, not only the exporting subset.
We proceed checking whether there are biases and, if this is the case, addressing them.
Let us discuss with some detail the subtle case of why selection may happen with the shocks
of equations (16) and (17). Theoretical models provide reasons by which firms self-select into the
export market according to their productivity levels. Empirical papers have found that this is the
case (see, for example, Melitz and Redding, 2014). In our case, self-selection may happen for both
productivity and product advantages. The predictable part of productivity and product advantages
has been replaced in our equations by observables, so they do not constitute a problem. However,
the current (unpredictable at − 1) shocks are still present.
Suppose, generalizing on Olley and Pakes (1996), that the firm’s rule for exporting is that the
combination of productivity and product advantages should be above some threshold that is a
function of the state variables, namely capital and the value of the demand shifters. This is what
happens if we consider the firm taking dynamically profit maximizing decisions in the presence of
fixed cost of exporting. If the firm makes the decision to export in the same period of the shock, then
the state variables and the shock will be correlated conditionally in the continuation in the export
market (only firms with more capital and stronger demand shifters value will accommodate the
most negative shocks). This is indeed possible. However, it is not particularly likely. As Ackerberg,
Benkard, Berry and Pakes (2007) remark, this case depends on the anticipation of the shock and
the immediate reaction of the firm entering or withdrawing (from the export market).
We estimate equation (13) including the inverse Mills ratio based on a probit estimation for
the decision to export in the universe of exporters and non-exporters. In the system, we check for
possible sample selection by extending Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure of inverting the probability
of exporting to control for the unobservable threshold in our two-dimensional setting. To anticipate
the results, we find a slight but significant eﬀect of selection in margins and elasticities, which we
correct accordingly, but we do not find any eﬀect in the system.
6.3 Endogeneity.
Once −1 and −1 have been replaced by observables, the problems of endogeneity are limited
to the possible correlation between any of the included variables and the composite disturbances
1 and 2 through the components   and 
Our specification of marginal cost brings three endogenous variables:   and  They are
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endogenous because they are determined at a moment of time at which  and  are known
Variables  and  are also correlated with  The exogenous marginal cost determinants are
 −1 −1 −1 and −1 In practice,  and −1 are strongly correlated and we focus on
−1. We have to estimate only three marginal cost related parameters (   and  ) so the
four remaining variables are enough to identify them. Notice that the lagged values help to estimate
the coeﬃcients of the endogenous variables because the coeﬃcients in diﬀerent parts of the equations
are the same (for example, variables  and −1 share the same coeﬃcient ).
Some of the demand shifters are potentially endogenous, they might be correlated with the dis-
turbances 1 and 2 through their components  and  This is not the case with the location
of the firm or its age/experience in the market, because location and entry were probably decided
time before the realization of the disturbances. It is more likely that the reception of a subsidy is
related to a shock suﬀered contemporaneously by the firm. The choice in sales eﬀort likely occurs
after the disturbances are realized (implying the same timing that we assume for the variable inputs
 and ). To be safe, we only use moments dated at time − 1 for all demand shifters.
6.4 Instruments.
Let b = (bb) be the parameter estimate from equation (13). After plugging in this estimate, write
the residuals of (16) and (17) as a function of variables  and vector  of parameters that remain
to be estimated. Let them be the  × 1 vectors 1(   b) and 2(   b). We base estimation
on the moments

⎡
⎣ ()1(   b)
()2(   b)
⎤
⎦ = 0
where (·) is a matrix of functions of the exogenous variables   with dimensions  ×   with 
denoting the number of moments (we employ the same set of instruments for each equation). The
literature on optimal instruments (Amemiya, 1974; Newey, 1990, 1993) establishes that variance can
be minimized by functions of the form
() = 
∙·(  0 b)
 |
¸

where the dot indicates 1 or 2 and 0 is the true value of 
In our equations, the derivatives inside the expectation turn out to be linear in the endogenous
variables, and these variables can be expressed in terms of the lagged observables. In addition, the
derivatives of the unknown functions enter the expectation because parameters show up inside these
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functions. All this suggests that a good approximation to the expectations can be obtained using
polynomials on all variables inside the unknown functions and some interactions.
We use the following instruments for each equation: a constant, a set of time dummies, the dummy
for location; a complete third order polynomial in the key variables −1 −1 and −1; a third
order polynomial in −1; variable  We add univariate third order polynomials in the lagged
shifters Age−1, Experience−1, Subsidy−1, Saleseﬀort−1 that we enlarge with a polynomial in
the variable State participation−1 Additionally, we found the interactions between Subsidy−1
and −1 as well as Sales eﬀort−1 and −1 to be important. We use 50 instruments in each
equation to identify 43 parameters. We get reasonable estimates in the 10 industries using exactly
the same set of instruments.
6.5 Estimation procedure and consistent standard errors.
We set the GMM problem as
min
⎡
⎣
1

P
 ()1(   b)
1

P
 ()2(   b)
⎤
⎦
0c
⎡
⎣
1

P
 ()1(   b)
1

P
 ()2(   b)
⎤
⎦
where  is the number of firms and we use the consistent weighting matrix
c =
⎡
⎣ (
1

P
 ()()0)−1 0
0 ( 1
P
 ()()0)−1
⎤
⎦ 
Our two-stage procedure implies that we have to estimate consistent standard errors (see Wooldridge,
2010). Stacking all moments in the vector (   b) =
⎡
⎣ ()1(   b)
()2(   b)
⎤
⎦  where  is the union
of vectors  and   the GMM problem can be more compactly written as
min [
1

P

(   b)]0c [ 1 P (   b)]
and the asymptotic variance of b expressed as
(b) = (0)−10(0)−1 
where  = [5( 0 0)] and  is the probability limit of c The derivation of matrix  is in
Appendix E. It reflects both the variance of the moments in the GMM estimation and the previous
NLS estimation. The asymptotic variance (b) is estimated by replacing the probability limits
by estimates and computing matrix  as shown in the appendix.
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7. Results
7.1 Estimation.
Estimating functions  and .
Table 3 reports the estimates of functions  and  carried out to constrain the estimation of the
demand elasticities  and  and the parameter of scale  (see subsection 5.5). Columns (1) and
(2) report the result of regressing the dependent variable, the log of revenue over variable cost or
margin (PACM), on a constant and the nonlinear eﬀect of the share of exports in sales (Export
intensity), according to specification (13). Column (3) reports the root mean square error of the
equations and reveals a reasonable fit. In fact, the estimated equation is linear enough for the
R-squares to be meaningful. They range from 0.54 to 0.66.
The first result that emerges from the estimation is that the more a firm exports the lower its
total margin. Taken as a simple (quasi) linear predictor, the equation says that the domestic margin
is the largest margin and that the total margin decreases with the intensity of the exports. The
value of the domestic margin by industries is given by the intercept in column (1). The slope of the
predictor can be read as the diﬀerence in percentage points between the typical domestic and export
margins. The diﬀerence ranges from the 3 percentage points in Metals to the 11 percentage points
in Food. The average across all industries is 6 percentage points.
Under our structural interpretation, we are estimating the functions  = ln 1 −1 and  =
−1
−1 − 1 At this stage, we cannot disentangle the value of demand elasticity from  in the
function  and we can only get a relative assessment of the elasticities by looking at the estimated 
function. However, the estimates for function  anticipate an important diﬀerence in the elasticities.
The data confirms what we expect from theory: the demand for exports has a larger elasticity given
competition with a higher number of substitute goods.59 This has an important pricing implication:
given marginal cost the firm is expected to set a lower price in the exports market to equate marginal
revenue in both markets.60
59This coincides with what classical structural IO literature tended to find: less market power and smaller margins
in export markets. See, for example, Bernstein and Mohnen (1991), Bughin (1996) and Moreno and Rodriguez (2004).
The likely higher toughness of competition in foreign markets has also been recently underlined by the theoretical
trade literature (see, for example, Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2014 and 2016).
60One may wonder what is the average diﬀerence of PACMs between exporters and non-exporters. This question is
not relevant here but is related to the diﬀerence in markups between these two kind of firms addressed, for example, in
De Loecker and Warzysnski (2012). We give an answer to the question of the diﬀerence of PACMs in Section A6 of the
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Robustness checks and selection.
Because our estimates of the functions  and  play an important role in the estimation of the
system, we want to check their robustness with respect to potential problems of mismeasurement.
We check the possible eﬀects of adjustment costs of labor, subsidy distortions (Hsieh and Klenow,
2009), shocks to demand, transportation costs and time varying margins.61 Later, we also report the
result of relaxing the assumption of common demand elasticities for the firms in a given industry. We
find the estimation quite robust for all of these misspecifications and leave the equation unchanged.
However, sample selection is relevant and we correct for it as follows.
We estimate the probability of exporting, using observations from all firms in each industry, by
means of a nonparametric specification.62 The inverse Mills ratio corrects for a slight downward bias
when estimating the domestic margins, and it leaves the diﬀerence between domestic and exports
margin almost unchanged (see columns 4, 5 and 6). To estimate the system, we use the  and  in
columns (4) and (5). Columns (7) and (8) report for reference (and to help with intuition) the levels
of the domestic and exports price-average cost margins.
System for exports and domestic sales.
Table 4 summarizes the results of estimating equations (16) and (17) subject to the restrictions
implied by functions  and  estimated in the first step.
The production function parameters are key coeﬃcients. Columns (1) to (3) show their point
estimates and standard errors. The elasticities of the inputs are reasonable, as are the global returns
to scale. In Chemical, Transport and Electronics the returns to scale are not distinguishable from
unity. In Food, Textile, Furniture, Paper, Metals and Machinery they range between 092 and 096.
Only Non-metals are 090.
The elasticities of demand, estimated simultaneously, are reported in columns (4) and (5). Their
relative values make full sense. In Electronics, firms have the greatest market power, both domesti-
cally and abroad, whereas Textile is (almost) perfectly competitive. Elasticities in the world market
are systematically greater than in the domestic market, sometimes by a significant extent. This
supports the identification approach of this paper.
Online Appendix, where we show that exporters tend to have slighly smaller global margins than non-exporters but
also slightly greater domestic margins. We cannot strictly give an answer to the question of diﬀerent markups because
it cannot be excluded that exporters and non-exporters diverge systematically in the ratios average cost/marginal
cost. However, see the comments in the appendix.
61Table 3c in the Online Appendix reports the robustness checks, which are commented on there.
62We consider a complete second order polynomial in the following lagged variables: capital, wage, materials, age,
subsidy and sales eﬀort.
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Our elasticities lie on the right tail of the distribution of elasticities estimated in the IO and trade
literature. This can partly reflect the specificity of the Chinese economy and its exports. However,
it is also the result of the way we estimate them. The elasticities of demand are identified by the
observed margins and the simultaneously estimated parameter . Our method of identification,
in contrast with other methods, requires the mutual consistency of three measurements: short-run
profits, parameter of scale and elasticities.63 The three estimates are sensible, which is unusual
for exercises of this type.64 The key diﬀerence that can explain our results is that the estimated
elasticities are robust with respect to the presence of product advantages correlated with prices.
Recall that demand shifters are used to control for all observable product advantages. We have
included four shifters in each equation: Location,65 Age of the firm (sometimes replaced by Expe-
rience),66 Subsidy and Sales eﬀort. The shifters are common to both equations but we allow for
diﬀerent impacts in each market.
The variable Sales eﬀort is the most important shifter (see columns 9 and 13). We enter the
expenditure in logs, so that the coeﬃcients can be read as elasticities of revenue with respect to the
value of these expenditures. Elasticities are positive and, in nine out of the ten industries, significant
both in the domestic and exports equation. The average elasticities of the significant values are 1.5
and 1 respectively, but they range from 0.3 to 3.8. Promotion tends to be more eﬀective in the export
63The rate of short-run economic profits is a simple transformation of the price-average cost margins:  =
−
 = 1 − (
−1  +
−1  ) = 1 −  +  where 1 = 1  + 1  is a weighted average of the
inverse of the elasticities (or aggregate markup). This generalizes a similar expression which holds when there is only
one market and therefore one elasticity. Short-run economic profits, scale parameter and elasticities are linked by this
expresion.
64To estimate markups, the literature has followed two broad approaches. In one, elasticities are estimated from
the specification of a demand system (see for example Hottman, Redding and Weinstein, 2014 and 2016, for a recent
application). In the other, markups are derived from the first order condition of one factor or several factors together.
This is the traditional Solow-based Hall (1990) method, recently revisited by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
Wathever the approach, the estimates have implications for profits, but often they are not developed or tested against
observations. Short-run profits are equal to markups only if  = 1 and profits are greater (smaller) than markups if
 is below (above) unity. When the first method is employed there is usually no available estimate of  and profits
remain ignored. When the second method is applied,  is often left implicit although it oﬀers (through profits) a nice
test about the likelihood of the estimates (Gordinchenko, 2012, makes also this point). For example, an elasticity of
3 with a parameter  = 09 implies short-run profits of 40% , which is hard to believe.
65 In the face of the diﬃculties for treating the dummy variable Location as an argument of the nonparametric
functions we finally gave up and included it in the linear part of the equations. Its coeﬃcients shoud be consequently
read as reduced form impacts.
66We never include Age and Experience together because are highly correlated variables.
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market. The estimated elasticities give us in fact an interesting check of the internal consistency of
the whole estimates and of the price elasticities.67
The shifter Subsidy (columns 8 and 12) is often non-significant.68 In general, subsidies are asso-
ciated with more sales (domestic and exports) in Paper, Machinery and Transport, and with less
sales in Food and Chemical. The variable Age, columns (7) and (11), explains significant positive
diﬀerences in sales in both markets for Chemical, Metals, Machinery, Transport and Electronics (in
the export market for Machinery and Electronics the variable used is Experience). Firms located
in the Middle-West area tend to have less sales, particularly in the export market.
Robustness checks on the estimation of the system.
We carry out robustness checks for our assumption of equal elasticities, the presence of arbitrary
forms of heterogeneity across four-digit subindustries, the eﬀect of selection, and our assumption of
an equal impact across markets of product advantages.69
We reestimate equation (13) with elasticities that change with the size of firms, quality of products
(measured through workforce skills), and foreign participation, and then we reestimate the system.70
Neither the coeﬃcients of the system nor the estimated productivity and product advantages (com-
pared with the estimates that we are going to report for the main specification) change significantly.
Our final assessment is that the specification of heterogeneous elasticities along these lines is a feasi-
ble refinement that does not modify the basic results. To consider arbitrary forms of heterogeneity,
we reestimate the system including the corresponding subindustry dummies at the four-digit level.
This uses 392 dummies (see Appendix C). The new specification induces very small changes in the
estimates of the coeﬃcients, productivity and product advantages.
Our sample only considers firms that simultaneously sell in the domestic and export markets. As
explained in Section 6, this raises the possibility that the system should be corrected for sample
selection. Recall that if there is sample selection the expectation of the Markov processes becomes
67Recall that, by the Dorfman and Steiner (1954) condition, the optimal value of sales eﬀort expenditures over
revenue should equal the ratio of elasticities with respect to sales eﬀort and price. Dividing column (9) by column (4)
and column (13) by column (5) one gets the optimal values of sales eﬀort according to our estimates. The domestic
values range from 5% to 18% , with a mean of 9.7%, and the exports values range from 3% to 10% with a mean of
5.6%. The ratios are all quite sensible and hence a reason to trust the estimates.
68The shifter Subsidy is in per unit terms and coeﬃcients are therefore semielasticities. For example, in the Food
industry, a subsidy of 1 percent of sales is associated to 2 percent less sales for a given price (and rest of shifters) in
the domestic market, and 6 percent less sales in the exports market. Recall from Table 2 that the average subsidy is
1% of revenue.
69The results are reported in detail in Section A6 of the Online Appendix.
70We find elasticity eﬀects of these variables but none for the location and age of the firm.
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a function of an unobserved threshold. We test for possible sample selection bias and we conclude
that there is no such bias.
The same product attributes can have a diﬀerent impact in the domestic and export market. We
allow for this possibility by estimating an additional parameter  as coeﬃcient of  in the domestic
market. We conclude that the generalization to models with market specific product advantages is
highly desirable. However, the current model is not too restrictive when imposing the constraint
 = 1, at least for an important part of the industries.
7.2 The estimated  and 
Once we estimate the parameters of the system, we can back up  and  using equations (15).
We back up both unobservables in diﬀerences with respect to the mean in each industry and, abusing
notation, we keep the symbols unchanged. As a result, we can read the values of  and  as
reflecting percentage diﬀerences with respect to the advantages of a hypothetical firm with average
advantages in this particular industry and period. An important outcome of this transformation is
that we can compare the values of  and  across industries.
We report, for better comparability,  and ( − 1) Variable  reflects productivity
diﬀerences. With markup pricing, these diﬀerences become also eﬃciency-driven price diﬀerences
between firms. Recall from the model that  reflects percentage quantity advantages given price,
so it has a diﬀerent scale than  Inverting revenue, it is easy to see that ( − 1) can be
read as the implicit willingness of consumers to pay a diﬀerent price from the baseline price. We
choose to divide  by  − 1 as a matter of convenience, but the results could also be presented
in terms of ( − 1) (recall that the ratio  is constant for each industry). At some
point, we are also going to multiply  by the firm-level weighted average of the inverse elasticities
1
−1 =  1−1 +  1−1  where  and  are the firm-level revenue shares of domestic
sales and exports. However, we prefer not to abuse this expression because shares are endogenous.
Distribution of  and 
Columns (1) through (9) of Table 5 summarize the marginal distributions of  and (−1)
Figure 1 depicts the level sets of the joint density of  and ( − 1) at the starting and final
time intervals (1998-2000 and 2005-2008).71
Columns (1) to (6) of Table 5 report the quartiles of  and ( − 1) in the initial and final
71 In the Online Appendix, Figure A1, we depict the marginal densities and their changes over three moments of
time (1998-2000, 2001-2004 and 2005-2008).
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year of the sample, 1998 and 2008. Columns (7) and (8) report the standard deviations of  and
( − 1) for the same years. Column (9) provides a measure of the skewness for the whole
distribution of values  and ( − 1)
Both the interquartile ranges and the standard deviations describe a significant dispersion that
tends to be somewhat greater in the product advantages (with the exception of industries Timber
and Non-metals, the industries with less product diﬀerentiation). The interquartile ranges of 
show diﬀerences between 40% and 60% (in Electronics the interquartile ranges of  are larger in
both years). The corresponding diﬀerences in willingness to pay range between 35% and 85% (in
Machinery and Electronics, there are larger interquartile ranges). Given the values of the elasticities,
the ranges of ( − 1) imply huge diﬀerences in sales for the same prices. This is a notable
dispersion, but it simply mirrors the real dispersion of revenues for firms with similar costs and
productivity. As shown in column (9), cost advantages are fairly symmetric, but product advantages
are systematically skewed to the left (except in Metals).
Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) carry out "physical" TFP measurements with firm-level
quantities of selected quasi-homogeneous products. They report a standard deviation of TFP of
0.26. We get standard deviations that tend to be slightly less than twice this value. This makes
sense if we take into account the high heterogeneity of products included in our industries. And
it is far below of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), that use the same data source that ours for the years
1998-2005. They estimate a standard deviation of their "quantity" TFP of 0.95 and an interquartile
range of 1.28. The reason is that they do not try to separate the impact of demand heterogeneity.
As they remark, their measure "is a composite of process eﬃciency and idiosyncratic demand terms
coming from quality and variety".72
Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2016), working with a sample similar to the one of the 2008
article, use the within product-year residual of their demand estimate to asses demand heterogeneity.
Their standard deviation is 1.47. We can transform this into a deviation that is roughly comparable
with ours dividing by their highest demand elasticity estimate of 3: 1473−1 = 0735 In 2008, our
average standard deviation for ( − 1) is 0.548. The diﬀerence may occur because, when we
72Their VA measurement for TFP in the presence of observed and unobserved demand shifters would be, in terms
of our notation and with total revenue 
exp() = ×


−1
 exp(− +−1 )
 1−

Omitting the shifters on the right hand side implies to add their value to  .
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measure (−1) we have already subtracted a lot of variation in demand through our included
observed shifters.73
Forlani, Martin, Mion and Muuls (2017) get standard deviations of their productivity and "product
appeal" measures which are greater than ours and quite similar to each other. The model of Hottman,
Redding andWeinstein (2016) distinguishes four sources of "demand size" variation: cost advantages,
product "appeal", markups and product scope (a role for the number of products associated to the
CES assumption). It concludes that "appeal" and product scope, two eﬀects that we implicitly
collapse in our product advantages, account for four fifths of the size eﬀects, something quite extreme
that can be an eﬀect of the low estimated elasticities (and hence small price eﬀects).
In summary, our estimated distributions turn out to be sensible and very informative. We get
reasonable measurements of persistent productivity and product advantages for broad product dif-
ferentiated industries, which compare favorably with other measurements in more homogeneous
settings or other trials to separate the advantages with heavy parametrization. Our results general-
ize two important things that were first shown by Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) for their
quasi-homogeneos goods sample. Productivity and product advantages show a significant hetero-
geneity, which tends to be greater for product advantages. We are able, in addition, to characterize
with detail the unrestricted joint distribution of cost and product advantages as follows.74
Negative correlation, other correlations and implication.
The unobserved advantages  and (−1) have a strong negative correlation, as reported in
column (10) and illustrated by the level sets of the joint densities in Figure 1. There is nothing in the
model that implies such correlation, so this is an important finding of our exercise. This says that
firms that possess unobserved cost advantages tend to have weak unobserved product advantages,
and firms that have unobserved product advantages tend to show less unobserved cost advantages.
Recall that  =  −  therefore unobserved  is only a part of marginal cost. Hence,
it is relevant to characterize the correlation between the observed and unobserved parts. Column
(11) shows that ( ) is strongly positive. This indicates that productivity is positively
73 In fact, the availability of new observed demand shifters has significantly narrowed the dispersion of the estimated
unobservable advantages in diﬀerent versions of this paper.
74Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008 and 2016) identification strategy is based on the assumption that TFP
and demand advantages are unocrrelated (TFP is used as instrument for price). In what follows, we show that
demand advantages are highly correlated with TFP. As there is no reason to think that this correlation is absent in
quasi-homogeneous good industries, this introduces an important doubt on the consistency of their specific estimates.
This is also an identification assumption in Hottman, Redding and Weinstein (2014 and 2016).
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associated to higher observed costs. For example, to higher wages of more skilled workers and
greater cost of high quality materials. At the same time, it is also crucial to characterize the
correlation of product advantages ( − 1) with total marginal cost . Column (12) shows
that ( ( − 1)) is also strongly positive.75 The conclusion is that more product
advantages are aﬀorded with the trade oﬀ of higher costs, both observed and unobserved (less
productivity).
All of this strongly suggests one of the main conclusions of this paper: many firms that have
important cost advantages is because they sell standard or even low quality products that are
cheaper to produce. Additionally, firms which show important product advantages acquire them at
the expense of clear disadvantages in the cost of their products, presumably due to the higher costs
of producing the goods which embody these advantages (technology, design, quality,...). Columns
(13) and (14) show that despite the cost of advantages, real profits and estimated advantages (both
taken separately and jointly) are mostly positively related. Therefore, firms have incentives to strive
for both kind of advantages.
Can we say something on the economics of the advantages? Think of the plane of all possible
pairs ( (− 1)). If firms are equal in all observed factors (costs, shifters), and able to freely
choose their combination of advantages from its idiosyncratic endowment in a family of "parallel"
balanced concave frontiers, it is easy to see that profit maximizing firms would show positively
related amounts of  and ( − 1)76 With    firms tend to prefer more cost than
product advantages, but the locus of profit maximization pairs would be a positively sloped line.
However, the observations of the real ( (−1)) pairs tend to be spread along the negatively
sloped isoprofit curves. Firms reach similar levels of profitability with very diﬀerent combinations
of advantages. This suggests two facts. First, advantages have an important uncertain component
which escapes the direct control of firms. Second, even if firms are able to invest to impact the
advantages and their relative importance, the abilities of firms to influence each kind of advantage
(the transformation curves) are very heterogeneous (according to technological knowledge and past
investments, say). The exogenous Markov processes that we have used in our modeling seem to be
perfectly able to detect in practice this heterogeneity. However, this outcome points to a completely
new aim of research that is particularly policy relevant: the possibilities, incentives and limits of
firms’ investment in the development of each advantage.
75Roberts, Xu, Fan and Zhang (2016) find a positive correlation of 0.795 between their firm eﬀect, formally com-
parable to our product advantages, and their marginal cost specification.
76 See the explanation in section A6.3 of the Online Appendix.
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7.3 Changes over time.
Changes in the means.
The change in the means of  and ( − 1) over time provides an estimate of the growth of
average productivity and product advantages. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show this growth.
To report the growth of product advantages, we multiply  by the weighted average of the inverse
elasticities. This facilitates the decomposition of the total growth of the product advantages into a
gross component and an eﬀect of entry (see below).
The increase in the means of  is huge and relatively even, ranging across industries from
24% to 60%. The growth of the means of the product advantages is, on the contrary, extremely
heterogeneous. In two industries, Electronics and Machinery, product advantages grow at the same
large rate as cost advantages. However, the other industries show very modest gains or none at all.
Additionally, in Transport the average product advantages decrease. Figure 2 shows the evolution
of mean cost and product advantages over time.
As markets have been subject to significant net entry, it is possible that the greater demand
available to firms has been counterbalanced by the increase in the number of firms competing for
this demand. To check this conjecture, we estimate the net entry into markets and decompose the
mean of ( − 1) into two components: gross growth and the eﬀect of entry77 . Columns (3) and
(4) show that entry tends to have a negative impact on the individual product advantages but it is
small.
Contributions to growth.
Adding the two terms in the unobservables of each one of equations (14) it is possible to compute
the total eﬀect of the growth of advantages on revenue growth in each market. Doing this calculation
with the estimates of the cost and demand advantages, and for the whole period, one can determine
the proportion of growth attributable to each unobservable. We then compute a sales weighted
average of the growth contributions across industry revenues, domestic and exports, excluding the
industry of transport equipment whose product advantages evolve quite negatively. Despite its
heterogeneity, unobservable product advantages explain about 24% of the revenue growth based on
productivity and demand heterogeneity.
Decomposition of aggregate changes.
To assess the sources of global changes, we weight productivity and product advantages by revenue
77See section A6.3 of the Online Appendix for details
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shares. Then we aggregate and decompose the change of these aggregates over time in terms of the
"dynamic Olley and Pakes decomposition" proposed by Melitz and Polanec (2015). Columns (5) to
(12) report the results.78 In this decomposition, entrants and exitors contribute to aggregate growth
if their productivity or product advantages diverge from the ones of survivors.79
The contributions of entry and exit to productivity growth tend to be unimportant. This means
that the productivity of entrants and exitors compared with the productivity of the survivors shows
small diﬀerences. At the end of the period, entrants turn out to be slightly less productive than
survivors. This points to two main facts: entrants tend to enter with less productivity or cost advan-
tages and the process to acquire them is slow. Exitors tend to be firms that show less productivity
than the firms that survive. Therefore, their disappearance tends to contribute positively to the
growth of aggregate productivity. However, none of the diﬀerences are dramatic.
The contributions of survivors to the growth of aggregate product advantages is negative in seven
industries and virtually zero in another. The group of survivors loses product advantages over
the period. The contribution of entrants is instead positive in seven industries. In five industries,
the growth explained by entrants is larger than the negative growth induced by survivors. The
disappearance of the exitors also makes some significant positive contributions. This implies that
product advantages possessed by exitors were significantly lower than survivors’ advantages.
Additionally, the growth of productivity and product advantages of survivors can be split into
the shift of the mean of their distribution and the change of the covariance between the involved
variable and the survivors’ shares ("reallocation" component). Reallocation among survivors makes
an important positive contribution to the growth of productivity but it is also responsible for the
negative growth of product advantages.80 At the end of the period, product advantages are displaced
towards the smallest survivors.
78We could have presented the decompositions for each one of the markets but patterns across markets turn out to
be quite similar.
79We consider survivors the firms that are in the sample for the starting year, 1998, and remain until 2008, but also
the firms that are present only in 2008 but were already born in 1996. Therefore, the number of survivors is diﬀerent
in 1998 and 2008. There is also a minor ambiguity here: when a firm is an addition that is exporting we are not
sure when it started to export. We take it notwithstanding as survivor. Entrants are the firms present in the sample
in 2008 that are born during the period or existing non-exporting firms that start exporting. Exitors are all firms
present in 1998 that either shut down or stop exporting during the period. Newly created and shutting down firms
dominate the sets of entrants and exitors respectively. Details of the decomposition can be found in Section A6.3 of
the Online Appendix along with additional results in Table 6b.
80 See Table 6b of the Online Appendix.
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Summarizing, there are no dramatic diﬀerences in productivity and productivity growth between
survivors, entrants and exitors, only the traditional cost disadvantage of entrants which resumes
over time. However, product advantages are developed by the entrants, possibly at the expense of
exitors and some survivors. Selection into the market is determined more by product advantages
than productivity. Reallocation is also important: productivity becomes more linked to the largest
market shares and product advantages to the smallest survivors.
7.4 Three examples.
In this subsection, we briefly sketch three examples of economic questions in which the distinction
and quantification of cost and product advantages are relevant. In the first example, the separation
helps give a richer description of the process of privatization and shows that the state is particularly
bad at the development of product advantages. In the second, the relative degree of cost advantages
is closely associated with the degree of specialization in exports by Chinese firms. Specialization in
exports is a puzzling trait of firms’ heterogeneity in trade. In the third, the technological investment
of firms and the use of a highly skilled workforce are shown to build product advantages for products
which have higher cost of production than their substitutes. It is an important relationship that puts
forward an idea very relevant for theoretical and empirical studies on reallocation: "cost diﬀerences"
are not equivalent to "cost distortions".
Privatization and firms eﬃciency.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 7 show the evolution of  and (−1) for the groups of "always
private" firms and firms that experience a change of status (see Section 4 for the details of this
taxonomy).81 Columns (1) and (2) show that average productivity growth is systematically higher
during the period for firms in the process of privatization. In contrast, columns (3) and (4) show
that product advantages grow at the same pace for privatized and private firms in four industries,
and evolve better for private firms in other five 82
To further explore these numbers, we form for each industry a panel subsample of status-changing
firms subject to the condition that firms start as state participated and end as private (although
81We exclude the group "always state participated" firms because the state tends to retain only a small amount
of very well performing firms. The behavior of productivity and product advantages of this group of firms is almost
entirely determined by the selection operated over the years.
82Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) find a somewaht higher productivity growth of the firms in transition
(page 349).
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we admit back and forth changes in participation in between). For this subsample, we explain the
evolution of measured productivity and product advantages by means of the following regression:
 =  +  +  + 
where  =  or ( − 1)  represents a time eﬀect common to all firms and the variable
 is a step dummy that takes the value one the first time that a firm is observed to be
without state participation and in all subsequent periods.83 We estimate two versions of the model:
replacing  by a constant and keeping the fixed eﬀects  as a form to allow for firm specific levels
of productivity and product advantages.
Columns (5) to (8) of Table 7 report the estimates of . The comparison of the diﬀerent es-
timates allows to establish several facts.84 Privatization during the period first aﬀected the firms
with relatively high productivity and, in half of the industries, firms with relatively low product
advantages. The high growth of productivity, which characterizes the firms in transition, is however
weakly related to privatization itself, as the control by fixed eﬀects shows. The growth of product
advantages is in fact even not influenced by privatization.
To summarize, the privatization of firms somewhat helped increase productivity but did nothing to
develop product advantages, despite this being a motive for privatization. It follows that the product
advantages are contributed by the "always private firms," particularly the newly born private firms
(recall the analysis of entry in subsection 7.3). Firms coming from the intervention of the state seem
more sluggish in the development of product advantages.
Specialization in exports.
In all industries, Chinese exporters show a bimodal distribution of export intensity with a pro-
nounced "U-shaped" form. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show two extreme intervals of the
distribution (exporting less than 20% of sales, exporting more than 80%). These intervals concen-
trate between 50% to 60% of exporters. In what follows we show that the degree of specialization
in exports is highly associated with the firm’s relative intensity in cost advantages. This suggests
that developing cost advantages and becoming a manufacturer highly specialized in exports is an
optimal decision for many firms. Developing a full model for this choice is beyond of the scope of
83Small variants in the construction of  do not significantly change the results.
84Using a constant, if privatization was earlier in more eﬃcient firms we expect a positive bias in  The reason is
that we have more observations with one in the indicator coming from relatively eﬃcient firms. Conversely, we expect
a negative bias if privatization was earlier in the relatively less eﬃcient firms. The introduction of fixed eﬀects oﬀers
a diﬀerent perspective: the estimate of  is exclusively based in comparing the residual eﬃcency of each firm under
privatization with its eﬃciency before privatization.
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this paper. Our aim is to simply show that the distinction between cost and product advantages is
a relevant component to explain the trade heterogeneity of firms.85
Using our estimates of  and ( − 1) we construct the index of relative cost advantages
.86 Then, calling export intensity  years of experience in the export market  the
eﬀect of other unobserved factors  and using a logit transformation, we estimate the OLS model
ln

1−  = 0 + 1 + 2
2 + 33 + 4 + 
This model could be further improved with interactions between the included variables and with the
addition of other explanatory factors, but we feel that the basic form is suﬃcient for our current
purposes. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 report the marginal eﬀects of  and  on 
Column (5) reports the 2 of the regression. The 2 is not high in Textile and Metals, but this very
simple model explains one third of the variance for Paper and Machinery and more than half of the
variance for the other industries.
The index of relative cost advantages has a uniform impact. Except for Textile, an additional
percentage point of cost advantages implies an increase between 1.3 and 2.3 percentage points of
export specialization. In most industries the youngest firms in the market are the most specialized.
Columns (6) and (7) show the "U-shaped" pattern of the distribution of predicted export inten-
sities. The model fails to explain the observed pattern in Textile and Metals, however, it does a
good job in the other industries. Figure 3 reproduces the complete distributions for all industries
excluding Textile and Metals.
We conclude that intensity in cost advantages is strongly associated to the specialization of some
firms in the export market. The natural way to interpret these results is to think of firms that choose
to produce standard products (in technology, design, quality...) but are able to reach significantly
lower costs in producing them.
Technological investments and workforce skills.
We use the data on R&D and workforce skills (see Section 4) to investigate the relationship
85Lu (2010) stresses the "U-shaped" form of the distribution of export intensity of Chinese manufacturers. Puzzled
by the appearance that exporters have lower productivity, her paper tries an explanation in which domestic markets
select the most eﬃcient firms. Our distinction between cost and demand advantages allows for another look at
unexplained facts put forward in her paper: many heavy exporters are very cost eﬃcent but deprived of the product
advantages that characterize firms with greater domestic sales.
86To do so, we drop the values of  and (−1) below the first decile of each distribution (01 and 01(−1))
and we compute the index of cost advantages as  = ( −01)[( − 01) + ((− 1)− 01(− 1))] Of
course, this a somewhat arbitrary construction that could be modified in many ways.
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between technological investments/quality of labor and the estimated cost and product advantages.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 show that firms that perform R&D activities have, in 7 industries,
some cost disadvantage. Because  reflects the eﬃciency with which production inputs are used,
this indicates that firms which undertake technological activities require a larger quantity of factors
to produce a given quantity of their products. Conversely, columns (4) and (5) show that in the
same 7 industries, firms with R&D expenditures have higher product advantages. This implies
that the relatively higher cost of the products of the firms undertaking R&D results in superior
characteristics that enhance demand. Columns (3) and (6) illustrate that the relationship described
above generalizes to R&D intensity. All industries show a negative relationship between R&D
intensity of firms and cost advantages.87 However, R&D intensity has a positive correlation with
product advantages for firms in 7 industries. The upper graphs of Figure 4 depict the nonparametric
regressions of  and ( − 1) on R&D intensity.
Columns (7) and (8) report the correlation of  and (−1) with the quality of labor. Quality
of labor is positively associated with cost advantages in 8 industries. Notice the apparent paradox:
firms with higher wages show more cost advantages. What happens is that firms experience greater
reductions of their marginal cost because the impact of productivity associated with the quality of
labor. On the other hand, the quality of labor is positively associated to product advantages in 7
industries. Both relationships taken together say that firms that have relatively high quality workers
are firms with both relative unobserved cost and product advantages. The bottom graphs of Figure
7 depict the nonparametric regressions of  and ( − 1) on the quality of labor.
To summarize, both R&D activities and the quality of the workforce push forward the product
advantages of firms while at the same time are associated to increasing production costs. This points
out at a missing piece of the current theoretical and empirical studies on reallocation of resources.
These studies typically interpret all cost diﬀerences as coming from marginal productivities of inputs
that are not equalized due to frictions or intervened input prices. Without denying such distortions,
the above analysis shows a fundamental heterogeneity of firms that implies observed and unobserved
87While a negative relationship between  and performing R&D is consistent with the rest of the findings here,
it is in partial contradiction with the usual finding that R&D investment stimulates productivity (see Doraszelski
and Jaumandreu, 2013). R&D would be more associated with heterogeneous quality than with the eﬃency in the
production of similar varieties, something China and period specific that matches well the small proportion of per-
forming firms. Some necessary caveats are: the incomplete character of the data and the two steps treatment of the
relationship.
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costs with a counterpart in product advantages.
8. Concluding remarks.
With a sample of Chinese manufacturing firms, which operate domestically and in the export mar-
ket, we have succeeded in estimating separately the joint distribution of cost advantages (unobserved
productivity) and product advantages (unobserved demand heterogeneity), and how it changed from
1998 to 2008. Using the multimarket character of the firms we have disentangled cost and product
advantages without observing output prices, and estimated the unobservables simultaneously as non
funcionally-dependent and freely correlated Markov processes. Using its distribution, we have char-
acterized the growth of Chinese manufacturing and described its weaknesses. But the distinction of
advantages is of more general interest: it has turned out useful to develop new insights and policy
implications in many traditional topics.
This paper also has methodological consequences. Dealing explicitly with demand heterogeneity
has turned out to be important for at least two estimation aims. First, to assess properly productivity
heterogeneity and to uncover an inverse link between demand heterogeneity and classical (quantity)
productivity measures. Second, to avoid biases induced by heterogeneity of demand in the estimation
of the production function coeﬃcients and to compute realistic demand elasticities and markups,
consistent with sensible short-run returns to scale and profits.
The results can be extended in several ways. First, a model implying diﬀerent marginal costs in
each market can be tested with some more data. Second, the assumption that product advantages
have a similar impact in both the domestic and export markets can be relaxed at the cost of giving
more structure to the diﬀerences between markets, something which seems worth trying. Finally, our
model has shown how easy is to relax the assumption of common industry elasticities. A systematic
exploration of elasticity variation across firms in the industry would provide additional insights on
markup heterogeneity.
There are also two more general pending tasks, that here have been excluded only for simplicity.
On the one hand, applying the results to analyze the distribution of the non-exporters that have
been excluded from our sample. On the other, to explicitly include R&D and the human capital in-
vestments of firms in the processes  and .88 This is the way to assess the ultimate determinants
of growth and start an exploration of the economics of the advantages.
88As Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013, 2017) do with R&D.
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Appendix A: Proof of the proposition.
Proof : Let’s consider the matrix
⎡
⎣  − 1 1
 − 1 
⎤
⎦ 
By assumption all principal minors of this matrix do not vanish. Multiplying the first column by¯¯¯
1



¯¯¯
and the second column by 1

 we get the matrix of semielasticities
⎡
⎣
1



1



1



1



⎤
⎦ 
We have multiplied each column by a positive value, and therefore we preserve the property of non
vanishing principal minors. Now multiply the first row by  and the second by  For the same
reason as before, we get a matrix of derivatives with non vanishing principal minors
⎡
⎣








⎤
⎦ 
Writing equations (5) in the text as the system of equations (·)− = 0 and (·)− = 0
we observe that the above matrix is the Jacobian of the system. A system is invertible if no principal
minor of its Jacobian vanishes (Theorem 7 of Gale and Nikaido, 1965)¥
Appendix B: Variables
Middle-West location. Dummy that takes the value one for firms located in the Middle and
Western parts of China.
Year of birth. Year the firm was born.
Age. Current year minus the year in which the firm was born.
Entry. We consider that the firm is an "economic" entrant if when it is included in the sample
for the first time it was born that year or one of the two previous years.
Exit. We consider all disappearances from the sample as "shutdowns".
Experience. Current year minus the first year that the exports of the firm are non-zero (years
after "entering" the export market).
Subsidy. State aid received by the firm as proportion of sales.
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State participation. We compute the share of the state in financial capital as the sum of the
reported state and collective capital over total financial capital. The "always state" are firms that,
while in sample, are state participated. The "always private" are the firms that, while in sample,
never have state participation. The remaining category are the firms that go over a change.
Foreign participation. The amount of capital owned by foreign firms over total financial capital.
Revenue. Revenue after taxes, at current prices, as reported by the firm.
Exports. Value of industrial export sales after taxes, at current prices, as reported by the firm.
Export intensity. Exports divided by revenue.
Price of output. Output price index of the two-digit industry the firm belongs to, taken from
China Statistical Yearbook (CSY).
Capital. Real stock constructed as follows. Firms report the value of their capital stock at original
purchase prices and their capital stock at original purchase prices less accumulated depreciation.
From these nominal values, we estimate a sequence of real investments and real capital stock at the
starting year. Capital is then constructed by applying the perpetual inventory method assuming a
yearly depreciation of 9%. For firms founded before 1998, we apply a method similar to Brandt, Van
Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012). We first estimate a yearly nominal rate of investment in fixed assets
at the two-digit industry level using 1998-2003 firms’ data. We assume that capital accumulates
constantly at this rate from when the firm was created. We then estimate the capital stock at birth,
deflate it, and compute the real stock in the first year. The investment deflator is taken from Brandt,
Rawski and Sutton (2008), updated using the Fixed Asset Investment price index from CSY.
Cost of materials. Estimate of the intermediate consumption in production as follows. The survey
definition of intermediate inputs includes direct materials, intermediate inputs used in production,
intermediate input in management, intermediate input in business operations (sales cost) and finan-
cial expenses. As we want to use a measure of variable cost, the inclusion of general management
expenses, sales cost and financial costs is problematic. Alternatively we started by the manufac-
turing costs (which include materials), labor cost and depreciation of capital during the process
of production. From these manufacturing costs, we have then deduced the imputed wage bill and
imputed depreciation of capital. From 2004 to 2007, we can do this using the detailed information
on the structure of intermediate inputs. For the rest of years we assume the same proportions.
Price of materials. Estimate of a price index for the intermediate consumption of the industry the
firm belongs to. As Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) we did compute a weighted average
of the output prices for the industries from which the industry of interest purchases its inputs. For
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the weights, we use the Input-Output table from 2002, that includes 42 sectors. The two-digit
manufacturing price indices are from CSY. The prices of agriculture, construction, transportation,
retail, wholesale and some service sectors are calculated by comparing GDP at current prices and
constant prices of the Collection of Statistical Material from 1949 to 2009.
Materials. Cost of materials divided by the price of materials.
Wage bill. We add up wages, unemployment insurance premium, pension and medical insurance
premium, housing mutual fund and total welfare fees. It should be taken into account that firms
only began to report retirement and health insurance in 2003, and housing benefits in 2004.
Employment. Total number of employees, which includes all the full-time production and nonpro-
duction workers, as reported by the firm. It excludes part-time and casual workers.
Wage. Wage bill divided by employment.
Variable Cost. Sum of the cost of materials and wage bill.
Revenue over Variable Cost. Revenue divided by variable cost.
Sales eﬀort. (Log of) All expenditures related to sales (e.g salesforce wages and advertising
expenditures) as reported by the firm.
Sales eﬀort intensity. Sales eﬀort divided by revenue.
R&D. Expenditures in R&D activities as reported by the firm. There is only data for the year
2001 and the period 2005-2007.
R&D intensity. R&D expenditure over revenue.
Workforce skills. Ratio of the firm wage to the average of wages of all the firms in the industry.
Appendix C: Industry correspondence and number of subindustries
Industry Two-digit industries Four-digit ind. (No.)
1. Food, 13. Agricultural and by-product proc. 49
drink and tobacco. 14. Food manufacturing
15. Beverage manufacturing
16. Tobacco products
2. Textile, 17. Textile 33
leather and shoes. 18. Apparel, shoes, and hat manuf.
19. Leather, fur, and coat prod. manuf.
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Industry Two-digit industries Four-digit ind. (No.)
3. Timber 20. Wood proc., and other wood prod. 13
and furniture. 21. Furniture manufacturing
4. Paper and 22. Paper making and paper products 10
printing products. 23. Printing and recording media reprod.
5. Chemical products. 26. Chemical materials and products 61
27. Pharmaceutical
28. Chemical fiber
29. Rubber products
30. Plastic products
6. Non-metallic minerals. 31. Non-metallic minerals products 30
7. Metals 32. Ferr. metal smelting and rolling proc. 37
and metal products. 33. Non-ferrous metal rolling processing
34. Metal products
8. Machinery. 35. General machinery manufacturing 73
36. Special machinery manufacturing
9. Transport equipment. 37. Transportation equipment manuf. 23
10. Electronics. 39. Electronic machinery and equipment 63
40. Elec. commun. equip. and computer
41. Instr., meter, stat. and oﬃce machine
Appendix D: A model with diﬀerent marginal costs.
Let’s assume that
 = 1 exp()
()(1−) exp(−)
 = 1 exp()
()(1−) exp(−)
where  = 0 +ln + 1 ln− −  The terms  and  are  = ( )−( )()
and  = ( )−( )()  Therefore we are admitting that the capital used
and/or the prices of the inputs are diﬀerent between the good produced for export and domestic
sale.
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Using optimal pricing expressions, marginal costs can be rewritten in terms of revenue as
 =
µ 
 − 1
¶−(1−)Ã

!
()1− exp(−)
 =
µ 
 − 1
¶−(1−)Ã

!
()1− exp(−)
Rewrite optimal prices in terms of these expressions. Take equations (9) and plug in the price
expressions. Rearranging and taking logs we get
 =  − ( − 1) ln
 +
1
 (
 + ( − 1) + )
 =  − ( − 1) ln
 +
1
 (
 + ( − 1) + )
where  = 1 ln 0 −
(−1) ln
1

−1 and  = 1 ln 0 −
(−1) ln
1

−1 and where
 = 1 + (1− )( − 1) and  = 1 + (1− )( − 1)
Appendix E: Correcting the standard errors for two-stage estimation.
Our NLS estimator solves the problem
min
1

P

[ −(  )]2
which has first order condition
P

5( b)0[ −(  b)] = 0
To estimate the parameters  of the system we use the GMM estimator that solves
min [
1

P

(   b)]0c [ 1 P (   b)]
Because we expect [5(  0 0)] 6= 0 we have to correct the standard errors of b to ensure their
consistency (Newey and McFadden, 1994).
The first order condition for b is
[
P

5( b b)]0c [P

( b b)] = 0
Expanding
P
 ( b b) around 0 and substituting it back into the first-order condition we have
0 = [
P

5( b b)]0c [P

(  0 b)] + [P

5( b b)]0c [P

5(   b)](b − 0)
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where  is the value that makes the expansion exact according to the mean value theorem. Dividing
the sums of (·) and its derivatives by  replacing the result in the case of the derivatives by the
probability limit  = [5( 0 0)] replacing c by its probability limit  and solving for√(b − 0) yields
√(b − 0) = −(0)−10 1√ P (  0 b) + (1)
This expression allows us to deduce the variance of b.
Given the presence of b, we have to expand P (  0 b) around 0
1√
P

(  0 b) = 1√ P (  0 0) + [ 1 P 5(  0 )]√(b − 0)
=
1√
P

(  0 0) +
√(b − 0) + (1)
where  = [5( 0 0)] Similarly to b, an expansion and subsequent rearrangement of the
first order condition for b gives the expression for √(b − 0)
√(b − 0) = [5(  0)05 (  0)]−1 1√ P 5(  0)0( −(  0))
Plugging this representation into the expansion of 1√
P
 (  0 b), we have
1√
P

(  0 b)
=
1√
P

(  0 0)
+[5(  0)05 (  0)]−1 1√
P

5(  0)0( −(  0)) + (1)
Defining
e(  0 0) = (  0 0) +[5(  0)05 (  0)]−15 (  0)0( −(  0))
the new expression to derive the variance of b turns out to be
√(b − 0) = −(0)−10 1√ P e(  0 0) + (1)
Defining
 = [e(  0 0)e(  0 0)0]
we have
(b) = (0)−10(0)−1 
The asymptotic variance can be estimated by replacing the probability limits with estimates and
matrix  using an estimate based on ( b b) b5(  b) and  −(  b)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
State participation: proportion of firms
1998 2008
Number of Number of Prop. of ind. Export Middle-West Always Always Always Always
firms obs. sales in 2008 intensity location prop. Age Exper. state part. private state part. private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 5,548 21,048 0.263 0.444 0.221 10.4 3.8 0.426 0.220 0.045 0.795
2. Textile,leather and shoes 18,108 68,191 0.379 0.603 0.089 9.6 3.9 0.331 0.318 0.018 0.883
3. Timber and furniture 2,747 9,343 0.281 0.569 0.181 8.0 3.5 0.356 0.365 0.014 0.921
4. Paper and printing products 1,791 6,797 0.248 0.350 0.105 10.5 3.7 0.379 0.330 0.033 0.849
5. Chemical products 11,184 47,318 0.380 0.382 0.136 11.2 4.0 0.326 0.296 0.037 0.808
6. Non-metallic minerals 3,652 13,481 0.205 0.400 0.244 11.0 3.7 0.333 0.263 0.03 0.825
7. Metals and metal products 6,499 25,521 0.426 0.484 0.125 11.0 3.9 0.351 0.310 0.026 0.861
8. Machinery 9,008 36,944 0.445 0.361 0.118 13.3 3.8 0.375 0.257 0.029 0.843
9. Transport equipment 3,308 13,638 0.544 0.364 0176 12.0 3.8 0.362 0.271 0.035 0.848
10. Electronics 11,691 48,367 0.680 0.482 0.063 9.5 4.0 0.264 0.368 0.020 0.860
 Years 1998-2008.
 Average 1998-2008.
 Number of years.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (cont’d).
Subsidy Foreign partic. Sales eﬀort R&D Workforce
Prop. Mean Prop. Mean Employ- ln 

Prop. Mean Prop. Mean skills
of obs. subs. of obs. partic. ment of obs. intensity of obs. intensity (s. d.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 0.192 0.011 0.287 0.691 383 0.186 0.953 0.052 0.151 0.007 -0.068
(0.668)
2. Textile,leather and shoes 0.190 0.006 0.229 0.676 460 0.122 0.893 0.025 0.085 0.008 0.006
(0.482)
3. Timber and furniture 0.186 0.008 0.219 0.700 287 0.150 0.954 0.041 0.096 0.007 -0.020
(0.523)
4. Paper and printing products 0.153 0.009 0.234 0.800 368 0.173 0.924 0.035 0.105 0.009 0.004
(0.626)
5. Chemical products 0.222 0.009 0.258 0.762 404 0.196 0.955 0.046 0.243 0.013 -0.015
(0.630)
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.179 0.013 0.245 0.695 453 0.215 0.960 0.058 0.197 0.011 0.069
(0.619)
7. Metals and metal products 0.206 0.006 0.226 0.755 626 0.147 0.929 0.031 0.150 0.010 -0.101
(0.575)
8. Machinery 0.243 0.010 0.267 0.758 448 0.193 0.946 0.041 0.270 0.019 -0.028
(0.592)
9. Transport equipment 0.289 0.010 0.294 0.746 764 0.178 0.951 0.034 0.321 0.016 -0.267
(0.590)
10. Electronics 0.226 0.008 0.347 0.810 599 0.173 0.945 0.037 0.303 0.020 -0.0150
(0.608)
 Years 1998-2008.
 Average(s) 1998-2008.
 Mean of non-zero values.
Table 3: Estimating the  and  functions. Dependent variable: ln  .
NLS With sample selection correction Dom. margin Export margin
  Standard   Coeﬀ. on Mills r. ()− 1 exp()1+ − 1
(s. e.) (s. e.) error of equ. (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 0.234 0.108 0.174 0.255 0.108 -0.018 0.290 0.164
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007)
2. Textile, leather and shoes 0.144 0.035 0.108 0.147 0.036 -0.005 0.159 0.119
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
3. Timber and furniture 0.175 0.044 0.126 0.189 0.045 -0.014 0.207 0.155
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
4.Paper and printing products 0.193 0.055 0.141 0.215 0.055 -0.018 0.240 0.175
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
5. Chemical products 0.232 0.089 0.176 0.253 0.089 -0.022 0.288 0.183
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.229 0.034 0.158 0.264 0.036 -0.028 0.302 0.256
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
7. Metals and metal products 0.163 0.033 0.136 0.188 0.031 -0.026 0.207 0.171
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
8. Machinery 0.218 0.068 0.147 0.243 0.065 -0.028 0.275 0.198
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
9.Transport equipment 0.198 0.053 0.128 0.217 0.051 -0.020 0.242 0.182
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
10. Electronics 0.214 0.083 0.144 0.220 0.084 -0.008 0.246 0.149
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
  = ln 1 −1   =
−1−1
− 1
 ()− 1 = 1 −1 − 1
exp()
1+ − 1 = 1 −1 − 1 Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
 Standard errors computed using the delta method.
Table 4: Estimating the system for exports and domestic sales. Nonlinear GMM.
Demand
Input elasticity elasticity Shifters domestic sales equation Shifters exports equation
Industry k l m   Middle-West Age Subsidy S. eﬀort Middle-West Age Subsidy S. eﬀort
(s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 0.040 0.274 0.648 6.3 14.6 -0.227 0.083 -1.986 0.087 -0.617 0.015 -5.867 0.048
(0.014) (0.042) (0.043) (0.054) (0.016) (1.009) (0.074) (0.131) (0.019) (3.614) (0.164)
2.Textile, leather and shoes 0.030 0.391 0.517 20.3 66.4 -0.586 0.504 -0.014 2.816 -1.984 -0.596 -7.512 3.767
(0.006) (0.017) (0.017) (0.103) (0.075) (4.478) (0.270) (0.554) (0.323) (17.349) (0.804)
3. Timber and furniture 0.020 0.220 0.676 13.2 29.3 -0.345 -0.048 11.916 0.771 -0.988 -0.070 24.095 1.605
(0.018) (0.037) (0.037) (0.155) (0.103) (39.458) (0.214) (0.422) (0.127) (87.113) (0.560)
4.Paper and printing products 0.060 0.273 0.623 10.0 19.9 -0.564 0.232 35.415 1.547 -1.140 0.054 113.205 1.571
(0.013) (0.042) (0.039) (0.156) (0.148) (23.909) (0.403) (0.321) (0.096) (51.136) (0.567)
5. Chemical products 0.066 0.055 0.867 6.3 12.0 0.046 0.039 -1.929 0.625 0.013 0.025 -7.032 0.477
(0.009) (0.017) (0.015) (0.066) (0.015) (1.437) (0.073) (0.140) (0.013) (1.835) (0.083)
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.078 0.300 0.524 14.9 29.9 -0.501 -0.141 8.073 0.791 -1.196 -0.194 -0.170 1.755
(0.014) (0.027) (0.030) (0.146) (0.089) (10.801) (0.180) (0.301) (0.118) (20.753) (0.427)
7. Metals and metal products 0.059 0.223 0.665 14.9 26.1 -0.431 0.184 3.637 2.652 -0.696 0.098 -4.300 2.670
(0.009) (0.020) (0.021) (0.101) (0.064) (5.590) (0.364) (0.168) (0.049) (10.822) (0.513)
8. Machinery 0.074 0.202 0.685 8.7 17.2 -0.343 0.179 13.334 0.336 -0.766 0.245 20.508 0.536
(0.006) (0.020) (0.021) (0.059) (0.020) (9.442) (0.066) (0.118) (0.028) (15.765) (0.108)
9.Transport equipment 0.093 0.118 0.777 10.0 18.3 -0.065 0.051 23.039 1.028 -0.306 0.025 22.116 0.793
(0.011) (0.018) (0.021) (0.093) (0.013) (6.004) (0.125) (0.168) (0.010) (7.006) (0.191)
10. Electronics 0.077 0.505 0.454 6.1 10.7 -0.482 0.206 1.101 0.303 -0.918 0.277 -0.096 0.436
(0.009) (0.035) (0.033) (0.064) (0.017) (1.215) (0.066) (0.121) (0.023) (2.820) (0.109)
 In industries 8 and 10 the variable is Experience.
 Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and corrected for two-step estimation.
Table 5. Distribution of  and ( − 1)
Correl. Correl. Correl. Correlation of profits with
Quartiles 1998 Quartiles 2008 Standard dev. Skewness between  with −1   + −1
Industry 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75 1998 2008 1998-08  and   with  −1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1. Food, drink and tobacco -0.476 -0.197 0.119 -0.201 0.067 0.329 0.438 0.431 0.010 -0.400 0.669 0.587 0.010 0.147
-0.468 -0.016 0.396 -0.376 0.063 0.459 0.676 0.665 -0.131 0.134
2.Textile, leather and shoes -0.518 -0.224 0.069 -0.110 0.178 0.481 0.461 0.458 0.029 -0.285 0.883 0.691 0.177 0.002
-0.330 0.042 0.321 -0.272 -0.001 0.223 0.649 0.480 -0.158 -0.151
3. Timber and furniture -0.469 -0.221 -0.009 -0.095 0.101 0.301 0.358 0.303 0.016 -0.317 0.781 0.828 0.102 0.261
-0.169 0.059 0.190 -0.147 0.061 0.242 0.329 0.322 -0.175 0.203
4.Paper and printing products -0.508 -0.251 0.008 -0.072 0.158 0.398 0.377 0.381 -0.022 -0.449 0.713 0.733 0.199 0.013
-0.415 0.023 0.344 -0.380 -0.051 0.278 0.649 0.587 -0.033 -0.120
5. Chemical products -0.499 -0.213 0.060 -0.151 0.126 0.391 0.449 0.441 0.019 -0.839 0.271 0.899 -0.049 0.109
-0.371 0.031 0.360 -0.331 0.056 0.403 0.684 0.661 -0.127 0.095
6. Non-metallic minerals -0.725 -0.407 -0.089 -0.095 0.197 0.476 0.487 0.447 -0.020 -0.037 0.903 0.774 0.141 0.283
-0.176 0.017 0.189 -0.118 0.047 0.203 0.301 0.274 -0.148 0.305
7. Metals and metal products -0.500 -0.276 -0.048 -0.091 0.138 0.370 0.366 0.350 -0.001 -0.395 0.673 0.427 0.084 -0.057
-0.389 -0.057 0.296 -0.337 -0.058 0.230 0.534 0.517 0.042 -0.113
8. Machinery -0.467 -0.193 0.052 -0.138 0.105 0.344 0.415 0.381 0.028 -0.525 0.584 0.938 0.087 0.204
-0.869 -0.282 0.228 -0.162 0.193 0.477 0.695 0.556 -0.220 0.120
9.Transport equipment -0.673 -0.400 -0.116 -0.024 0.193 0.429 0.402 0.346 -0.003 -0.658 0.651 0.886 0.020 0.098
-0.246 0.056 0.322 -0.295 -0.002 0.243 0.454 0.487 -0.044 0.059
10. Electronics -0.813 -0.291 0.216 -0.330 0.108 0.568 0.789 0.732 0.034 -0.507 0.595 0.890 0.110 0.225
-1.129 -0.300 -0.383 -0.358 0.226 0.734 1.170 0.935 -0.160 0.118
 First row reports  second row ( − 1) (Mean-Median)/Standard Deviation
Table 6: Growth of  and ∆(−1) , weighted growth, and contributions to weighted growth 1998-2008.
Comp. of ∆(−1)

Weighted growth of  and contributions Weighted growth of (−1) and contributions
Industry ∆ ∆(−1) G.growth Entry Total Survivors Entrants Exitors Total Survivors Entrants Exitors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 0.244 0.073 0.060 0.013 0.150 0.127 -0.070 0.093 0.089 -0.124 -0.002 0.215
2.Textile, leather and shoes 0.415 0.026 0.032 -0.006 0.404 0.506 -0.142 0.040 0.035 -0.118 0.278 -0.125
3. Timber and furniture 0.321 0.014 0.036 -0.022 0.279 0.255 -0.016 0.041 0.036 0.092 -0.076 0.020
4.Paper and printing products 0.411 0.020 0.005 0.015 0.596 0.718 -0.080 -0.042 -0.209 -0.606 0.183 0.214
5. Chemical products 0.336 0.027 0.046 -0.019 0.421 0.440 -0.064 0.045 -0.016 -0.050 0.108 -0.074
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.601 0.028 0.033 -0.005 0.693 0.632 -0.004 0.065 0.010 0.006 -0.051 0.055
7. Metals and metal products 0.414 0.000 0.010 -0.010 0.479 0.705 -0.114 -0.112 -0.006 -0.266 0.333 -0.072
8. Machinery 0.314 0.375 0.386 -0.011 0.377 0.485 -0.081 -0.027 0.391 0.182 0.115 0.094
9.Transport equipment 0.600 -0.038 -0.033 -0.005 0.669 0.743 -0.115 0.041 -0.117 -0.332 0.116 0.099
10. Electronics 0.430 0.448 0.476 -0.028 0.617 0.621 -0.173 0.169 0.185 -0.132 0.182 0.132
 1
−1 =  1−1 +  1−1  where   are firm level revenue shares of domestic sales and exports. 1% of observations at each tail of the distribution of have been trimmed for this exercise.
 P0808 −P9898
 P08 08(−1) −P98 98(−1)  Includes additions that were already born in 1996.
 Includes starts in the export market.
 Includes firms that stop exporting.
Table 7: Cost and demand advantages in the process of privatizacion.
Growth 1998-2008 Impact of ownership change
∆ ∆( − 1)  ( − 1)
With Always With Always No-FE FE No-FE FE
Industry change private change private (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 0.260 0.187 0.110 0.004 0.106 0.021 -0.112 0.014
(0.024) (0.015) (0.033) (0.011)
2.Textile, leather and shoes 0.592 0.418 -0.244 -0.044 0.041 0.037 -0.013 -0.020
(0.019) (0.008) (0.018) (0.005)
3. Timber and furniture 0.276 0.258 0.047 0.046 0.063 0.023 0.020 -0.005
(0.040) (0.022) (0.032) (0.014)
4.Paper and printing products 0.434 0.371 -0.164 -0.079 0.079 0.036 -0.102 0.005
(0.045) (0.025) (0.087) (0.023)
5. Chemical products 0.301 0.228 0.046 0.110 0.064 0.009 -0.069 0.011
(0.017) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010)
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.620 0.436 0.102 0.100 0.060 0.018 0.009 0.007
(0.033) (0.016) (0.015) (0.007)
7. Metals and metal products 0.493 0.331 -0.210 -0.026 0.084 0.033 -0.020 -0.005
(0.024) (0.011) (0.029) (0.012)
8. Machinery 0.384 0.287 0.181 0.168 0.079 0.012 -0.069 0.004
(0.021) (0.009) (0.035) (0.007)
9.Transport equipment 0.670 0.415 -0.063 0.006 0.022 0.002 -0.053 0.018
(0.037) (0.015) (0.032) (0.020)
10. Electronics 0.460 0.327 0.351 0.352 0.027 0.011 0.034 0.012
(0.042) (0.018) (0.051) (0.015)
Table 8: Cost and demand advantages and export specialization.
Observed distribution Marginal eﬀects in the regression of export intensity Predicted distribution
Industry of export intensity () Relative cost advantage Experience of export intensity ()
 ( ≤ 02)  ( ≥ 08) (s. d.) (s. d) 2  ( ≤ 02)  ( ≥ 08)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 0.308 0.278 2.246 -0.017 0.599 0.303 0.227
(0.023) (0.002)
2.Textile, leather and shoes 0.167 0.406 0.160 0.009 0.133 0.000 0.051
(0.017) (0.002)
3. Timber and furniture 0.187 0.390 2.175 0.011 0.667 0.114 0.328
(0.033) (0.003)
4.Paper and printing products 0.398 0.168 1.333 -0.026 0.348 0.333 0.042
(0.036) (0.005)
5. Chemical products 0.307 0.187 1.936 -0.021 0.860 0.311 0.173
(0.006) (0.001)
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.369 0.171 2.081 0.023 0.518 0.378 0.102
(0.041) (0.002)
7. Metals and metal products 0.253 0.315 1.428 -0.030 0.268 0.097 0.198
(0.021) (0.002)
8. Machinery 0.356 0.184 1.466 -0.014 0.354 0.294 0.068
(0.014) (0.002)
9.Transport equipment 0.380 0.182 1.888 -0.035 0.671 0.391 0.141
(0.022) (0.002)
10. Electronics 0.216 0.326 1.840 -0.001 0.523 0.173 0.290
(0.015) (0.001)
Table 9: R&D investment, workforce skills and cost and demand advantages.
& investment
Industry   Workforce skills
No R&D R&D ( & ) No R&D R&D ( & ) ( ) ( )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 0.025 -0.050 -0.049 -0.001 0.298 -0.078 0.159 0.128
2.Textile, leather and shoes 0.028 0.211 -0.013 0.045 -0.221 0.022 0.215 -0.051
3. Timber and furniture 0.026 0.010 -0.137 -0.002 0.114 0.070 0.185 0.058
4.Paper and printing products 0.034 0.099 -0.111 0.043 -0.119 -0.006 0.233 -0.039
5. Chemical products 0.062 -0.038 -0.040 -0.028 0.129 0.007 -0.033 0.049
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.102 0.053 -0.072 0.001 0.070 0.068 0.170 0.036
7. Metals and metal products 0.037 0.049 -0.119 0.051 -0.203 0.079 0.193 -0.104
8. Machinery 0.038 0.015 -0.138 0.061 0.071 0.065 0.017 0.189
9.Transport equipment 0.088 0.023 -0.048 -0.016 0.007 -0.014 -0.004 0.062
10. Electronics 0.066 0.007 -0.140 -0.003 0.214 0.094 0.137 0.157
 Statistics compued over the years 2001 and 2005 to 2007.
 Computed for firms with R&D expenditure.
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A3. Demand specification.
Our exercise only needs well defined individual demands, not the adoption of an specific
parametric model. The demands in equation (9) are expressions that, in logs, coincide with
a first order approximation to any demand. Put aside the observed shifters for simplicity.
The expression
 = ln0 − ( − ) +  
is the first order approximation in logs to demand  = (  ) around the point 0 =
(1 0) where we drop the time subindex and denote the industry values by the absence of
subindex. We use, without loss of generality, the restriction  ln
¯¯¯
0
= 1 And we consider
a common industry derivative  ln ln( )
¯¯¯
0
= − Notice that the intercept may be taken
as the demand available to any firm selling at average price and with average demand
advantages. The common elasticity assumption may be relaxed, as it could also be relaxed
(at a higher cost) the independence of the elasticity from  .
Our specification nests, as a particular case, the often used demands of the heterogeneous
goods generalization of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) CES system for a product diﬀerentiated
industry. Let’s see how. In Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) a representative consumer chooses the
consumption level of the numeraire and the quantities of each variety of a diﬀerentiated
good, aggregated in the index  =
µP−1 ¶ −1  The demand for each variety turns out
to be
 = 
µ

¶−
= 
µ

¶−

where  = P

 =  is the income spent on the diﬀerentiated good and  =³P 1− ´ 11− is the price of the aggregate quantity. The "elasticity of substitution" 
plays the role of the elasticity of demand  in our notation. Slightly departing from the
original formulation, let’s set the model in terms of average “equivalent” indices. Defining
 =
µ
1

P−1 ¶ −1 and  = ³ 1 P 1− ´ 11− we can write the demands as
 = 
µ

¶−

2
where  and  can be conveniently read as average values.
We can now allow the quantities  to be the observed quantities of goods of varying
degrees of attractiveness to the consumer by adjusting them by factors exp( −1) The model
treats the values (exp( −1)) symmetrically in the quantity index and utility function (see
Melitz 2000 for an specification of this kind). Now, at the same prices, the consumer buys
more of the variety with a higher  and the demands in terms of the observed quantities
become
 = eµe
¶−
exp()
where e = µ 1 P exp( )−1 ¶ −1 and e = ³ 1 P exp() 1− ´ 11− stand for the av-
erage quantity and price consumer preference-adjusted indices. e may also be written as
 e (average deflated revenue spent on the goods). This coincides with the type of
demand that we have specified. If the average quantity changes over time because of the
resources allocated by the consumer to this industry or the number of firms producing
actively, these changes can be incorporated as an aggregate change component of  .
Although our models nests the CES framework we do not want to impose to the data the
restrictions implied by this theoretical specification. For example, Hottman, Redding and
Weinstein (2016) specify a model with symmetric preferences on the consumer valuations
() with  called consumer "appeal" This implies to specify the particular value
 = (−1) ln An implication common to both our general model and the CES framework
is the relationship

 =
µ

¶−(−1) exp()
exp() 
that says that the relative sales of two varieties depend only on the relationship between
prices and the relative unobserved advantages (notice here, in passing, how restrictive can
be to forget about the observed shifters). With the Hottman, Redding and Weinstein (2016)
specification this relation becomes

 =
µ

¶−(−1)
or

 =
µ

¶−
for any two  and 
These last two expressions tell us that, with "appeal"-adjusted prices, we will observe in
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equilibrium the same sales and the same total consumer valuations across varieties. As it
is quite reasonable that prices reflect the diﬀerent costs of "appeal" (for example, marginal
cost may be proportional to the quality that determines the "appeal"), adjusted prices may
be equal and then there is no other source of variation of sales across varieties. To see the
consequence we follow up an example of the own authors. Assume that we observe the
sales of a can of Coca-Cola and a water bottle of Perrier at adjusted prices. If the number
of Perrier bottles is less than the number of Coke cans the model implies that consumers
value more Perrier water and less the Coke can, exactly by the amounts that are needed to
compensate the diﬀerence in quantities and get equal total valuations (and sales).1
A5. Data treatment.
A5.1. Linking the data.
Discontinuity of information for an existing firm occurs in the raw database for two rea-
sons. First, and most importantly, a firm can be allocated a diﬀerent ID (9 digit-code)
during the period. Firms may receive a new ID if they are subject to some restructur-
ing (change of name, ownership...), merger or acquisition. This creates numerous broken
sequences and spurious exit and entry. Second, if a non-state owned firm falls below the
sales threshold of RMB 5 million then it is not surveyed. If the firm re-enters the sample
keeping its ID, we only get some missing observations in its time sequence. However, the
firm can also not re-enter the sample. In this case we unfortunately have no strictly way to
distinguish its disappearance from economic shutdown. The likelihood of these situations
is however small.
With regards to the case of the changing IDs, we have done intensive work (in the style
of Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang, 2012) to link the data of the firms that presumably
1Hottman, Redding and Weinstein (2016) nest another CES utility over the diﬀerent products of the mul-
tiproduct firm rather than considering single products. However, this doesn’t change the basic propoerties of
symmetry of the model, that shows the commented behavior for the whole set of products of the multiproduct
firm and some additional properties on the number of products induced by the CES specification.
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had the ID changed. This process has used extensive information such as: the firm’s
name, corporate representative, 6-digit district code, post code, address, telephone number,
industry code, year of birth. We first check the neighbor years two by two, then the longer
panel sequences with the following/previous years. After linking the data, we treat all
disappearances from the sample as economic shutdowns assuming that the errors will be
small. We test this by checking whether the exit rates make sense.
The results are quite satisfactory. Focusing on manufacturing, considering firm time
sequences with a minimum of two years, we have a total of 445,397 firms and 2,253,388
firm-year data points. After our linking, firms stay in the sample an average of 5 years. We
have time sequences of 5 or more years for more than half of the firms, and more than 80%
of these sequences have no missing observations.
The linked data is summarized in Table 0a. Column (1) shows that the single observations
discarded after the process are a small percentage, except for the starting and final years, at
which the process of linking is more diﬃcult. Columns (2) and (3) document the growth of
the sample over time, particularly significant in the Census year of 2004. Entry and exit are
reported in columns (4) and (5). Entry is defined as the set of firms that are newly included
in the sample and born the same year or either of the two previous years. Its average rate
is 9.4%. Exit is defined as the set of firms that are last seen in the sample the previous
year and it shows an average rate of 7.9%. Exit is indirectly induced by our linking and can
include failures in the linking process as well as firms in a process of drastic downsizing.2
Both entry and exit show sensible values and explain a significant part of the increase
of the sample. The increase in newly born firms in the Census years of 2004 and 2008
is particularly high, probably reflecting the eﬀort of administrative authorities in being
exhaustive. The resulting net entry rate (entry minus exit), reported in column (6), is
positive starting in 2003.
Column (7) documents the increases in the sample which are not related to entry and
exit. Part of this improvement can be attributed to the increase of the number of firms
2 It also includes the 22 SOEs below 5 M RMB in 2006 that are not going to be surveyed the following
years. See the text.
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with a size above the threshold. A detailed analysis of the size of these additions shows
that between 60% and 80% are firms with sales between RMB 5 and 25 millions, the rest
are firms with mostly bigger sales. Therefore, it is likely continuous statistical improvement
of the Annual Census so that it covers more firms, which increases the size of the sample.
Column (8) computes the ratio of the aggregate industry value added plus value added
taxes to the industry GDP from the China Statistical Yearbook. Coverage is improving
over time, reaching near 90% in the final years.3 The degree of response of the sample
firms, considered year to year, tends to exceed 96% (see column 9).
A5.2. Data cleaning.
We clean the linked data according to the conditions reflected in Table 0b. We set
observations to a missing value if there are some particularly small values in revenue, capital,
wage bill and the cost of materials; some abnormal values in other variables (details in the
table); or some consistency problems (revenue is less than exports or less than sales eﬀort);
or variable cost (wage bill plus the cost of materials) greater than revenue; or financial
capital is less than the sum of the reported components. This enlarges the number of data
points without real information. We then use the longest time subsequence (adjacent years)
with complete information for each firm, provided that is greater than one year. The cleaned
sample retains 84% of the firms and 74% of observations.
A6. Results.
Table 3b explores the context of our  and  functions estimation. It reports the result of
regressing the dependent variable for all firms (exporters and non-exporters, in total more
than a million and a half observations) on a constant and a dummy which takes value one
3A comparison of industry aggregates with the aggregate numbers of the 2004 Census leads Brandt, Van
Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) to conclude that they match very well and account for about 90% of Chinese
industrial output. Our numbers match well with their numbers, except for diﬀerences in the content of
calculated variables. However, we prefer the comparison over time of the data aggregates with the global
GDP estimates.
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if the firm exports. We can read the result as telling us what is the mean price-average
cost margin for non-exporters and how it diﬀers for exporters. The mean margins for non-
exporters look reasonable, ranging across industries from 14 to 20 percent. When compared
with domestic margins in Table 3 it turns out that exporters tend to have slightly greater
domestic margins. But the important conclusion of this regression is that price-average
cost margins of the exporters are, if anything, slightly lower than the price-average cost of
margins of the firms that sell only in the domestic market. In five industries price-average
cost margins of exporters are lower by an amount that ranges from 1 to 2 percentage
points, in two more industries there is no significant diﬀerence, and only in three industries
the margins for exporters are up to 1 percentage point above the margin of non-exporters.4
Our target is, however, a diﬀerent object in a diﬀerent sample: the price-marginal cost
margins or markups of the exporters who also sell domestically, and in what follows we are
going to focus on them.
A6.1 Robustness checks on estimating functions  and .
Table 3c reports the results of several robustness checks on estimating functions  and 
Margins computed with variable costs can be problematic because labor is aﬀected by
costs of adjustment. This is why some authors prefer to use the margin over material costs,
although material costs are likely to be aﬀected by other rigidities (such the ones created by
outsourcing).5 Columns (1) and (2) repeat the main regression with the log of the ratio of
revenue over material costs as dependent variable. This measure seems a little noisier and
in two industries the diﬀerence of margins changes sign. However, we do not see evidence
4 In fact our regression can be compared with the regressions in de Loecker and Warzynski (2012), who
obtain higher markups for the Slovenian exporters when compared with the markups of the domestic sellers.
Their "Specification I" uses as dependent variable the log of revenue over the wage bill (instead of the whole
variable costs) corrected by a constant representing the Cobb-Douglas elasticity of labor and an estimated
error term. They run the regression controling for capital and labor. When we introduce these controls, two
more industries show significantly smaller margins for exporters and diﬀerences tend in general to increase.
5See Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2016) for an analysis of the eﬀects of outsourcing on the ratio materials-
labor.
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of a systematic bias using variable cost.
Subsidies have been argued as a source of distortions in Chinese manufacturing. To
check if this could be aﬀecting the estimated margins, we again run the baseline regression
with the parameter representing the function  interacted with the ratio subsidy over sales.
Results are reported in columns (3) to (5). We find in 6 industries relatively better margins
of the subsidized exporters but by negligible amounts (to see this multiply the coeﬃcients
by the mean subsidies in Table 2).
When domestic demand experiences a negative shock, firms can turn to the export market
to try to sell their excess of domestic production. This can, in principle, generate a negative
correlation between the disturbance of the equation and export intensity. This potential
correlation brings a plausible explanation for a downward biased estimate of the function 
(too big markup diﬀerences). To test for this possibility, we run the baseline specification
by GMM using lagged export intensity as instrument. The results are reported in columns
(6) and (7). The estimated diﬀerence between margins still increases in all industries. The
results indicate, if anything, a slightly positive correlation between export intensity and the
disturbance of the equation. This suggests that higher export intensity may be associated
with better times. However the changes are not dramatic so we do not consider it necessary
to change the baseline specification.
Exports can generate higher transportation costs for firms that are not located in the
coastal (East) area of China (between 6 and 24 percent of the firms in our sample, depending
on the industry, are located in the Middle and West areas). This cost varies with the
amount of exports and for these firms it aﬀects the average and marginal costs of exports.
It is possible that this cost is not included or only partially included in our variable cost
measure. We run the baseline regression interacting the slope with a dummy of Middle-West
location. Results are in columns (8) to (10). We find that in 8 industries the exporting
margins of these firms are not as poor as predicted by the general relationship. We conclude
that their exporting prices are likely to be higher just to cover for this extra unobserved
cost. As the proportion of aﬀected firms is small, and we do not see a significant change in
the rest of margins, we conclude that this is not likely to significantly distort our estimation
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of the elasticities.
Columns (11) and (12) report the result of estimating  and  over time. We recover
the implicit time-series of price-average cost margins and we compute their standard errors
over time. Variation over time is small without dramatic changes.
A6.2. Robustness checks on the system for exports and domestic sales.
We first check the result of allowing elasticities to vary across firms and over time. Equa-
tion (13) and our estimation procedure oﬀer a nice framework to generalize this aspect.
Grouping the firms in the industry into sets of firms that have diﬀerent elasticities, it is
possible to test for this variation (and its eﬀects) by means of heterogeneous  and  func-
tions to be brought to the system estimation. The elasticities of the firms in our sample
tend to change with the size of the firms, quality of products (measured through work-
force skills), and foreign participation, although diﬀerences are not dramatic. They do not
change, instead, with either location and age of the firm.
Table 4b reports the results of estimating the system with elasticities that vary with size
of the firms, quality of the product, and foreign participation. We define three dummies
that take the value one when the firm has a value that is greater than the sample mean.
Columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8) report the result of interacting these dummies with the
constant and the slope of the equation. This gives functions  and  that vary with the value
of these dummies and that we brought to the estimation of the system. Bigger firms, firms
with a higher quality product and with foreign participation tend to show greater market
power domestically. We now individually estimate varying elasticities in the system, and
columns (12) and (13) report averages across individuals. Nothing changes dramatically
with respect to the baseline estimation. Additionally we check the estimated productivity
and demand advantages (compared with the estimates that we report in Section 6 for the
main specification), they change very little.
To consider arbitrary forms of heterogeneity, we reestimate the system for each industry
including subindustry dummies at the four digit level. This requires the use of 392 total
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dummies (see Appendix E of the text). The results are reported in Table 4c. The new
specification induces very small changes in the estimates of the coeﬃcients, productivity
and demand advantages. We conclude that we could successfully estimate our specification
at a higher level of disaggregation with similar results.
Our sample only considers firms that simultaneously sell both in the domestic and export
markets. As explained in Section 4, this opens the possibility that the system needs to be
corrected for sample selection bias. In fact, we have found that the eﬀect of this correction
was small but significant in the equation that we use to estimate the  and  functions.
We now test the need for correction in the system. If selection operates, as explained in
the text, the expectations of the Markov processes become a function of an unobserved
threshold.  
[( − 1) + |−1 ( )   ] =Z ∞
()
Z ∞
()
[( − 1) + ]  ( |−1 −1)R∞
()
R∞
()  ( | − 1 −1)
=
( − 1)e(−1 −1  ) + e(−1 −1  ) = ( − 1)(·) + (·)
+(−1 −1  )
where −1 represents information available at − 1
Because the probability of exporting is related to the unobservable threshold we can, in
the tradition of Olley and Pakes (1996), invert this relationship and include the estimated
probability in the Markov processes for productivity and demand advantages. We use the
estimated probit equation for the probability of exporting based on the observations of
all firms. In practice, we introduce in both equations a second order polynomial in the
estimated probability, interactions of the probability with −1 and −1 and the product
of −1 and −1.
Unfortunately, one of the eﬀects of this introduction is that parameter  tends to become
very diﬃcult to estimate and the routine crashes.6 The model only converges normally for
6For a given  estimate, if  becomes too small the elasticity has a discontinuity and may become negative.
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Machinery and Electronics. We attribute this eﬀect to the often observed multicollinearity
problems introduced by the selection corrections. We correct this by fixing the parameter 
at its previously estimated value, allowing its components to be freely estimated. Table 4d
reports in columns (1) to (5) the result of estimating the system. The results do not reveal
any particular pattern that can be linked to selection. We might expect the coeﬃcient of
capital to increase once the negative correlation with the shocks conditional in exporting
is controlled for7. The coeﬃcient on capital tends instead to become smaller, which we
attribute to the multicollinearity problem. We conclude that there is no reason to be
worried about possible biases due to selection.
The same product characteristics can have a diﬀerent impact in the domestic and export
markets. We allow for this possibility by estimating an additional parameter  as coeﬃcient
of  in the domestic market. The introduction and estimation of  is not easy because
it tends to pick up any unbalance between the two equations. Therefore, it tends to break
the convergence of the model. Identification is probably very weak. Scaling the processes
of both equations by a common factor, depending of the industry price index (−[( −1)+
( − 1)]), the model converges (except in one industry, Textile) and we get reasonable
results. Table 4d reports the result of estimating the system specifying  as aﬀected by a
coeﬃcient  in the domestic market in columns (6) to (11). Parameter  is estimated close
to unity in at least half of the industries. The results indicate that in half of the industries
the diﬀerent impact of the advantages is not an important issue. However, in the other
four estimable cases we have sundry values of  that seem to indicate a diﬀerent impact of
the advantages. Interestingly, the elasticities and estimated productivities do not change
dramatically in these industries.
A6.3. Several details on the estimated  and 
The economics of cost and demand advantages.
7This is what happens in Olley and Pakes (1996) because bigger capital allows the firm to overcome the
worst shocks.
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Assume for simplicity that all firms are equal in observed costs and demand shifters, and
therefore heterogeneity is exclusively driven by the unobserved terms  and (−1) It
is easy to check that total profit (the sum of profits obtained in each market) is increasing for
 and  In addition, cost and demand advantages are "complements", in the sense that
the amount of each advantage increases the marginal profitability of the other advantage.
Isoprofit curves in the plane ( ( − 1)) have a negative slope steeper than -1 and are
concave. This is the result of the export market having a higher elasticity of demand, which
makes it desirable for the firm that has greater eﬃciency to sell more in this market. For
the sake of the argument, suppose that firms can transform one advantage into the other
given heterogeneous total endowments of amount [2+((− 1))2] 12  That is, firms have
perfectly balanced transformation curves at diﬀerent distances of the origin (represented by
the relevant portion of circumferences of diﬀerent ratios). With profit maximizing firms,
our observations on the pairs ( ( − 1)) would lie on a positively sloped curve with
slope less than one.
Decomposition of growth of demand advantages.
We decompose the demand advantages growth into a gross component and the eﬀect
of entry. The demand advantage of an individual firm in a particular market includes an
average component that is common with the rest of firms (see Section A3). This component
will shrink if the demand has to be shared with an increased number of firms. We can hence
write
∆( − 1)
= −[ (∆ ln −∆ ln )( − 1) +  (∆ ln −∆ ln )( − 1)] +∆∗( − 1)
where the term in brackets is the weighted sum of net entry faced by the firm8 and the
second term is the gross growth of the firm’s demand advantage.
We estimate rough rates of entry and exit in each industry and in the corresponding
exports market using the linked data and following the same methodology as in Section 5
to separate economic entry from additions. Net entry estimates from 1998 to 2008 (entry
8Entry in the export market is diﬀerent because it includes starts and stops.
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minus exit) for the domestic and exports market are reported in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 6b. They amount to an average net entry of 13% in the domestic market and 8% in
the export market.
Weighted means decomposition.
Calling  the variable of interest ( or ( − 1)) and  the revenue weights, the
Melitz and Polanec (2015) decomposition is
X21 −X11 = (2 − 1 ) + 2 (2 − 2 ) + 1 (1 − 1 )
where  = (
X
⊂
)
X
⊂
 and  =
X
⊂

X
⊂
 The growth of survivors can be
further split as follows (Olley and Pakes, 1996)
2 − 1 = (2 − 1 ) + [
X2(2 − 2 )−X1(1 − 1 )]
where 1 and 2 are simple means and the terms involved in brackets are covariances
multiplied by .
We report the three terms of the first formula in columns (5) to (12) of Table 6 and we
detail the split of the survivors term under the names "Shift" and "Covariance" in columns
(3) to (6) of Table 6b. We observe that the shares of entrants and exitors are all very
significant and the estimates should be very robust statistically. Shares are reported in
columns (7) to (10) of Table 6b.
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Table 0a: Manufacturing linked data
Years Discarded No. of firms Sample Entry Exit Net entry Additions Aggreg. output Response
single obs. growth rate rate rate /Industry GDP rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1998 0.153 129,671 - 0.142 - - - 0.557 1.000
1999 0.026 145,949 0.112 0.044 - - - 0.578 0.971
2000 0.025 149,371 0.023 0.050 0.093 -0.043 0.066 0.608 0.955
2001 0.021 159,471 0.063 0.081 0.110 -0.029 0.092 0.605 0.950
2002 0.018 170,979 0.067 0.070 0.075 -0.005 0.072 0.638 0.946
2003 0.030 184,537 0.073 0.084 0.080 0.004 0.069 0.626 0.943
2004 0.067 247,854 0.255 0.176 0.099 0.077 0.178 0.741 0.966
2005 0.009 263,681 0.060 0.069 0.046 0.023 0.037 0.760 0.939
2006 0.010 288,433 0.086 0.088 0.055 0.033 0.053 0.813 0.953
2007 0.021 315,769 0.087 0.086 0.057 0.029 0.058 0.881 0.966
2008 0.167 333,330 0.053 0.145 0.092 0.053 0.000 0.870 1.000
1998-2008 445,397 0.963
 We only retain firms which stay two and more years.
 As proportion of the remaining number of firms.
 There are 2,253,388 firm-year observations.
 New firms as proportion of number of firms at .   =  − +.
 Newly included firms born in , − 1 or − 2 as proportion of number of firms at .
 Firms last seen at − 1 as proportion of number of firms at  Not defined for 1998 and 1999.
 Entry rate - exit rate.
 Sample growth - net entry.
 (−   +   )      .
 Proportion of firms in sample at year  which report information.
 2008 entrants, 48,369 firms, treated (in this row) as if they were to stay two or more years.
Table 0b: Filters used to clean the linked data
Values are set to missing in the following cases:
Small values:
- Less than 8 workers or 30,000 RMBs in Revenue, Capital, Wage bill, Cost of materials.
Abnormal values:
- Negative value in Exports or Sales eﬀort.
- Zero or less in finacial capital, negative value in a financial component.
- Born before 1949 or after 2008.
Consistency:
- Revenue less than Exports, Sales eﬀort or Variable cost (Wage bill+ Cost of materials).
- Financial capital is less than the sum of its finacial components.
A missing value is an interruption of the firm time sequence. We only use the firm’s longest
time subsequence provided that is longer than one year.
The cleaned sample retains 83.7% of the firms and 73.6% of the observations.
Table 0c: Data and sample.
Firm’s category (proportions) Average size (labor) by category
Average levels Surv. Add. Entrants Exitors Surv. Add. Entrants Exitors
Firms Revenue Capital Labor Materials (and exp.) (/Starts) (/Stops) (and exp.) (/Starts) (/Stops)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Total 1998 75,949 43.732 28.001 333 32.529 0.246 0.754 407 307
data 2008 215,402 120.521 27.661 211 79.706 0.087 0.137 0.776 499 238 204
Growth 0.158 0.110 0.032 0.142
Sample 1998 11,948 117.852 86.926 739 86.971 0.199 0.801 1002 674
2008 34,749 301.975 72.834 451 193.722 0.068 0.127 0.805 1201 567 413
Growth 0.130 0.092 0.041 0.111
 Deflated by industry output price indices (Millions of RMBs).
 Deflated by an investment price index (Millions of RMBs).
 Number of workers.
 Deflated by industry materials price indices (Millions of RMBs).
 Categories in the sample are: Survivors and exporterss, Additions exporting, Entrants/Start exporting, Exitors/Stop exporting.
 Unweighted average of rates of growth.
Table 3b: Regressing ln  on export status, OLS.
Number Constant Exports dummy
of obs. (s. e.) (s. e.)
(1) (2) (3)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 168,548 0.193 -0.009
(0.001) (0.002)
2. Textile, leather and shoes 243,120 0.138 -0.017
(0.001) (0.001)
3. Timber and furniture 57,228 0.167 -0.020
(0.001) (0.002)
4.Paper and printing products 85,732 0.170 0.002
(0.001) (0.003)
5. Chemical products 273,603 0.203 -0.012
(0.001) (0.002)
6. Non-metallic minerals 144,666 0.199 0.008
(0.001) (0.002)
7. Metals and metal products 162,002 0.138 0.006
(0.001) (0.001)
8. Machinery 205,014 0.178 0.012
(0.001) (0.001)
9.Transport equipment 78,987 0.173 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
10. Electronics 176,791 0.187 -0.019
(0.001) (0.001)
 Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
Table 3c.Robustness checks on estimating functions  and .
 over cost of materials Eﬀect of subsidies GMM estimation Middle-West location Time varying margins
a b a b0 b1 a b a b0 b1 Dom. Exports
(s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. d.) (s. d.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 0.332 0.114 0.234 0.106 0.009 0.193 0.147 0.173 0.112 -0.037 0.271 0.143
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 0.012 0.007 (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.012)
2. Textile, leather and shoes 0.260 -0.025 0.144 0.037 -0.008 0.105 0.046 0.098 0.036 -0.006 0.158 0.117
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.014) (0.009)
3. Timber and furniture 0.291 0.030 0.175 0.046 -0.007 0.141 0.062 0.131 0.047 -0.028 0.199 0.150
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.034) (0.022)
4.Paper and printing products 0.303 0.015 0.193 0.056 -0.010 0.124 0.064 0.121 0.056 -0.094 0.218 0.142
(0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.034) (0.018) (0.026)
5. Chemical products 0.351 0.080 0.232 0.093 -0.023 0.181 0.115 0.169 0.093 -0.068 0.266 0.158
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014)
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.356 -0.041 0.229 0.038 -0.020 0.162 0.046 0.155 0.038 -0.034 0.261 0.229
(0.006) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.033)
7. Metals and metal products 0.275 0.017 0.163 0.034 -0.003 0.117 0.039 0.114 0.033 -0.004 0.182 0.141
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013)
8. Machinery 0.405 0.131 0.218 0.071 -0.014 0.162 0.079 0.157 0.069 -0.050 0.247 0.170
(0.004) (0.131) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
9.Transport equipment 0.358 0.095 0.198 0.056 -0.012 0.140 0.059 0.136 0.054 -0.046 0.227 0.165
(0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
10. Electronics 0.378 0.110 0.214 0.087 -0.018 0.168 0.097 0.162 0.084 -0.057 0.247 0.148
(0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013)
 Parameter b1 is the coeﬃcient on the interaction term. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
 Standard deviations over time of the estimated margins.
Table 4b: Specifying and estimating with elasticities which vary with firm size, product quality and foreign capital.
Estimating the system with varying elasticities
Estimating varying functions of the elasticities Input elasticity Demand elas.
Industry a0 a a a b0 b b b k l m  
(s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 0.160 0.085 0.073 0.064 0.020 0.131 0.095 0.051 0.051 0.121 0.829 6.7 13.6
(0.004) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.024) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007)
2.Textile, leather and shoes 0.126 0.014 0.020 0.030 0.030 0.011 0.016 -0.001 0.020 0.209 0.703 21.1 133.2
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012)
3. Timber and furniture 0.154 0.019 0.021 0.041 0.019 0.031 0.029 0.034 0.019 0.110 0.812 11.2 20.1
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015)
4.Paper and printing products 0.161 0.031 0.028 0.040 0.034 0.041 0.018 -0.009 0.032 0.101 0.797 10.0 19.9
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.019) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013)
5. Chemical products 0.168 0.058 0.061 0.085 0.030 0.093 0.047 0.063 0.058 0.104 0.891 5.2 7.7
(0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.196 0.012 0.041 0.067 0.029 -0.007 0.021 0.031 0.005 0.157 0.721 11.2 18.9
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
7. Metals and metal products 0.136 0.004 0.035 0.044 0.017 0.010 0.029 0.006 0.045 0.130 0.780 17.3 32.8
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
8. Machinery 0.187 -0.014 0.048 0.051 0.064 -0.015 0.015 0.006 0.048 0.202 0.722 8.2 16.3
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.021) (0.023)
9.Transport equipment 0.165 0.001 0.037 0.051 0.032 0.025 0.019 0.023 0.068 0.097 0.819 10.5 20.2
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
10. Electronics 0.174 0.000 0.055 0.041 0.051 0.026 0.037 0.024 0.046 0.281 0.640 8.1 20.3
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.021) (0.020)
 a· and b· denote the coeﬃcients of the interactions. Averages over the sample of the individual elasticities.
 Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
Table 4c: Estimating the system with subindustry dummies.
Input elasticity Demand elas.
Industry No of k l m  
subind. (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) ∆ ∆( − 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. Food, drink and tobacco 49 0.048 0.217 0.693 6.7 17.7 0.188 0.068
(0.010) (0.029) (0.033)
2.Textile, leather and shoes 33 0.016 0.440 0.469 20.1 64.0 0.441 0.024
(0.006) (0.023) (0.023)
3. Timber and furniture 13 0.016 0.214 0.682 13.1 28.7 0.320 0.014
(0.012) (0.038) (0.012)
4.Paper and printing products 10 0.063 0.266 0.628 10.2 20.9 0.406 0.022
(0.013) (0.042) (0.039)
5. Chemical products 61 0.033 0.280 0.571 11.5 173.4 0.298 0.108
(0.011) (0.025) (0.032)
6. Non-metallic minerals 30 0.063 0.303 0.518 15.4 31.8 0.596 0.036
(0.014) (0.031) (0.033)
7. Metals and metal products 37 0.054 .230 0.656 15.3 27.4 0.427 -0.023
(0.008) (0.020) (0.021)
8. Machinery 73 0.075 0.193 0.692 8.8 17.9 0.304 0.368
(0.006) (0.020) (0.021)
9.Transport equipment 23 0.075 0.113 0.779 10.2 19.2 0.586 -0.046
(0.009) (0.016) (0.018)
10. Electronics 63 0.084 0.392 0.559 6.4 11.7 0.376 0.407
(0.007) (0.034) (0.033)
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and corrected for two-step estimation.
Table 4d: Other robustness checks on the estimation of the system.
Estimating the system with selection Diﬀerent impacts of demand advantages
Input elasticity Demand elas. Input elasticity Demand elas.
Industry k l m   k l m   
(s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.) (s. e.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1. Food, drink and tobacco -0.004 0.237 0.685 6.3 14.5 0.043 0.276 0.648 1.039 6.2 14.3
(0.012) (0.044) (0.044) (0.014) (0.043) (0.015) (0.116)
2.Textile, leather and shoes 0.012 0.211 0.697 20.3 66.6
(0.003) (0.011) (0.011)
3. Timber and furniture 0.015 0.223 0.673 13.1 28.9 0.023 0.229 0.672 1.729 12.3 25.0
(0.010) (0.033) (0.033) (0.014) (0.043) (0.048) (1.752)
4.Paper and printing products 0.050 0.248 0.648 10.0 19.9 0.060 0.273 0.623 1.001 10.0 19.9
(0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.013) (0.042) (0.040) (0.205)
5. Chemical products 0.027 0.185 0.737 6.3 12.1 0.067 0.056 0.862 0.937 6.5 12.6
(0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.008) (0.018) (0.018) (0.088)
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.051 0.261 0.562 15.0 30.1 0.066 0.292 0.529 0.755 15.6 32.9
(0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.037) (0.027) (0.196)
7. Metals and metal products 0.018 0.266 0.622 15.0 26.4 0.059 0.214 0.672 0.952 15.4 27.9
(0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.008) (0.020) (0.019) (0.010)
8. Machinery -0.008 0.197 0.694 8.3 16.0 0.075 0.209 0.706 1.501 7.0 11.5
(0.010) (0.022) (0.009) (0.007) (0.024) (0.026) (0.253)
9.Transport equipment 0.025 0.141 0.754 9.9 18.3 0.046 0.180 0.685 0.445 14.4 45.2
(0.008) (0.025) (0.025) (0.010) (0.040) (0.042) (0.292)
10. Electronics 0.012 0.568 0.388 6.2 11.0 0.077 0.314 0.616 0.879 7.3 15.4
(0.020) (0.046) (0.013) (0.005) (0.026) (0.024) (0.016)
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and corrected for two-step estimation.
 We have been unable to compute the model with 
Table 6b: Rates of entry, decomposition of survivors’ growth, and shares of survivors, entrants and exitors
Decomposition of survivors’ Market shares
Market rates of net entry growth of  growth of (−1) 2008 1998
Industry Domestic Exports Shift Covariance Shift Covariance Survivors Entrants Survivors Exitors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1. Food, drink and tobacco -0.131 0.014 0.219 -0.093 0.072 -0.196 0.400 0.600 0.466 0.534
2.Textile, leather and shoes 0.233 0.073 0.369 0.136 0.046 -0.163 0.339 0.661 0.209 0.791
3. Timber and furniture 0.529 0.181 0.264 -0.010 0.024 0.068 0.230 0.770 0.270 0.730
4.Paper and printing products -0.213 0.000 0.370 0.348 0.037 -0.643 0.302 0.698 0.297 0.703
5. Chemical products 0.152 0.052 0.321 0.119 0.039 -0.088 0.389 0.611 0.366 0.634
6. Non-metallic minerals 0.115 0.033 0.536 0.096 0.016 -0.010 0.302 0.698 0.326 0.674
7. Metals and metal products 0.226 0.072 0.371 0.334 0.026 -0.292 0.447 0.553 0.399 0.601
8. Machinery 0.133 0.087 0.277 0.208 0.396 -0.215 0.420 0.580 0.314 0.686
9.Transport equipment 0.039 0.124 0.538 0.205 0.031 -0.300 0.380 0.620 0.369 0.631
10. Electronics 0.205 0.168 0.387 0.235 0.458 -0.590 0.360 0.640 0.405 0.595
 Rates 1998-2008.
 1% of observations at each tail of the distribution of  have been trimmed for this exercise.
 Includes additions that are not new born or starts in the export market.
 Includes starts in the export market.
 Includes firms that stop exporting.
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